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Abstract
Modern Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are essential for
monitoring and managing electric power generation, transmission and distribution. In the age
of the Internet of Things, SCADA has evolved into big, complex and distributed systems that
are prone to conventional in addition to new threats. So as to detect intruders in a timely and
efficient manner a real time detection mechanism, capable of dealing with a range of forms of
attacks is highly salient. Such a mechanism has to be distributed, low cost, precise, reliable
and secure, with a low communication overhead, thereby not interfering in the industrial
system’s operation.
In this commentary two distributed Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) which are able to
detect attacks that occur in a SCADA system are proposed, both developed and evaluated
for the purposes of the CockpitCI project. The CockpitCI project proposes an architecture
based on real-time Perimeter Intrusion Detection System (PIDS), which provides the core
cyber-analysis and detection capabilities, being responsible for continuously assessing and
protecting the electronic security perimeter of each CI. Part of the PIDS that was developed
for the purposes of the CockpitCI project, is the OCSVM module. During the duration
of the project two novel OCSVM modules were developed and tested using datasets from
a small-scale testbed that was created, providing the means to mimic a SCADA system
operating both in normal conditions and under the influence of cyberattacks.
The first method, namely K-OCSVM, can distinguish real from false alarms using the
OCSVM method with default values for parameters ν and σ combined with a recursive
K-means clustering method. The K-OCSVM is very different from all similar methods that
required pre-selection of parameters with the use of cross-validation or other methods that
ensemble outcomes of one class classifiers. Building on the K-OCSVM and trying to cope
with the high requirements that were imposed from the CockpitCi project, both in terms of
accuracy and time overhead, a second method, namely IT-OCSVM is presented. IT-OCSVM
method is capable of performing outlier detection with high accuracy and low overhead
within a temporal window, adequate for the nature of SCADA systems.
The two presented methods are performing well under several attack scenarios. Having to
balance between high accuracy, low false alarm rate, real time communication requirements
xand low overhead, under complex and usually persistent attack situations, a combination
of several techniques is needed. Despite the range of intrusion detection activities, it has
been proven that half of these have human error at their core. An increased empirical and
theoretical research into human aspects of cyber security based on the volumes of human
error related incidents can enhance cyber security capabilities of modern systems. In order to
strengthen the security of SCADA systems, another solution is to deliver defence in depth by
layering security controls so as to reduce the risk to the assets being protected.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Aim and Objectives
The current commentary is presenting two novel Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) that were
produced from the candidate in 2014. These IDS were designed to be a part of a Perimeter
IDS that was developed for the purposes of the CockpitCI project (see Section 1.5). Both
methods were developed and implemented from the candidate solely, using datasets and
live testbeds that were produced from partners of the consortium. The main objectives of
the research that was conducted in 2014 and led to the creation of these two novel methods,
were the creation of an IDS that could cope with novel attacks, operate in real time, be
accurate, could be easily integrated with the rest of the detection components, be distributed
and induce low communication overhead. Initially the K-OCSVM method was developed,
but the strict aforementioned requirements especially about high accuracy, led to the creation
of the second method, namely IT-OCSVM that met all the objectives.
1.2 Industrial Control Systems
An Industrial Control System (ICS) is an umbrella term that refers to a group of process
automation technologies, such as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
systems and Distributed Control Systems (DCS). Unfortunately, they have been subject to
a growing number of attacks in recent years [1]. As they deliver vital services to critical
infrastructure, such as communications, manufacturing and energy among others, hostile
intruders mounting attacks represent a serious threat to the day to day running of nation states
[2, 3].
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ICS have unique performance and reliability requirements and often use operating sys-
tems, applications and procedures that may be considered unconventional by contemporary
IT professionals. These requirements typically follow the priority of availability and integrity,
followed by confidentiality and include the management of processes that, if not executed
correctly, pose a significant risk to the health and safety of human lives, damage to the
environment, as well as serious financial issues such as production losses [4–6]. Failure or
security breaches of these systems could result in wide-reaching adverse impacts, not only
for the system under attack, but for the community and economy at-large that depends on
goods or services of the organization. For example, wide-scale blackouts due to a failure of
the electricity grid or an environmental disaster such as an oil or sewage pipeline releasing
its contents, plus any collateral impact. Cyber attacks could contribute towards the collapse
of a state if they initiate or prolong the failure of critical national infrastructure [7, 8].
Cyber warfare which causes blackouts, cuts off supplies to safe drinking water, makes
travelling dangerous or destabilises a national economy is clearly a threat to the stability of
a nation and is therefore a threat to international peace and security [9]. Unavailability of
critical infrastructure (e.g., electrical power, transportation) can have economic impact far
beyond the systems sustaining direct and physical damage. These effects could negatively
impact the local, regional, national, or possibly global economy [4]. When an incident occurs
on a CI, the consequences can be catastrophic having an impact on the environment, economy
and human life and a forensic investigation needs to take place [10, 11]. Taking one step
further, Robinson et al. in [12] cyber warfare will threaten civilian peace and security long
after a conflict has ended, and that existing peace operations will be required to evolve in
order to address this threat.
Despite the apparent risk to critical infrastructure, the security of ICS is not considered
a significant investment area. Naedele et al., in [13] argues that the costs involved in ICS
security are prohibitive, especially within critical systems, when the perceived risks to an
organisation or infrastructure cannot be adequately quantified and a business case not satisfac-
torily articulated. This often leads to an underdeveloped incident response capability in the
deployed operational ICS in particular within the SME supply chain. Larger infrastructures
suffer from the insufficient understanding of the deployed components such as Programmable
Logic Controllers (PLC) or similar Intelligent Electronic Devices (IED), Remote Terminal
Units (RTU) and input/output (I/O) devices that are used to manage electromechanical equip-
ment in either local or distributed environments. This unique environment, that combines
large scale, geographically distributed, legacy and proprietary system components presents
significant challenges to Security Operation Centers (SOCs) and Cyber Emergency Response
Teams (CERTs)[14]. A SOC centralizes the roles responsible for protecting information
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security in the organization, and includes prevention, detection, incident management and
response, reporting, governance, risk, and compliance. A CERT is a centralized function for
information security incident management and response in an organization. It may roll up
under a SOC, or it may act as the main security organization depending on your company’s
structure and security needs.
In the past, ICS were operated as separated networks unconnected to public commu-
nication infrastructures [15], but as businesses have turned to exploiting the services and
data provided by the Internet, such isolation that protected these systems has declined [16].
The benefits afforded by real time monitoring, peer to peer communications, multiple ses-
sions, concurrency, maintenance and redundancy have enhanced the services provided for
consumers and operators [17, 15]. Moreover, this interconnectedness will grow with the
implementation of smart grids and execution of the Internet of Things (IoT) [18]. Hence, the
previously isolated systems have become increasingly exposed to a range of threats [19, 20].
Regarding which, Byres et al,[21] cite that formerly isolated ICS now average 11 direct
connections across networks with weak network segmentation.
IT security is generally focused on protecting networked computer assets with clear,
shared attributes, but Zhu [22] argues that for securing ICS there needs to be a combination
of conventional computer security and communication networking with control engineering.
However, because of the of the current ICS systems, and their only having recently taken up
IPbased communications and linked devices, where traditional IT security, communications
security and the protection of control systems have their boundaries, remains unclear and
hence, their efficacy is still to be proven [20, 23]. Luallen [24] reports that for a survey of
268 respondent organisations to a survey, most did not report critical ICS assets and relied on
staff to detect issues, not tools.
1.3 SCADA Systems
SCADA systems have traditionally been associated with a subset of ICS referred to as Wide
Area Control systems (see Figure 1.1).
As aforementioned, security in SCADA systems is more salient than with most other
computer systems owing to the potential severity of the outcomes due to a degrading of
service as well as the disruption to day to day life. With older computer systems, reliability
was the key concern and security was much further down the list. Today, with greater
connectivity [25], security is now high on the agenda. Moreover, SCADA systems are not
only becoming more connected to the internet; the communications within them operate
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Fig. 1.1 A typical SCADA system
through shared Internet Protocol (IP) infrastructure [26]. A number of concerns in relation to
implementing security in SCADA have been raised in the extant research:
• System reliability regularly takes precedence over threats to security and can result in
high security vulnerability.
• Absence of encryption in earlier communication protocols (plain text is often utilised).
• The common used well-documented protocols, default passwords and off the shelf
hardware solutions can threaten to undermine obscurity [27]. Whilst this is not a
mechanism of security per se, the loss of it can lead to attacks becoming easier.
• The operation of an SCADA has to be ongoing, which makes it very hard to apply
updates, perform patching or to modify system components.
• Today’s systems are lasting longer than in the past, which means that hardware and
software are operating beyond their supported lifespan [28]. Also many experienced
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workers possess critical know-how that, if lost, makes it costly—if not impossible—for
the company to replace when retired or moved.
The aforementioned specific characteristics and constraints in relation to SCADA mean
that a domain-specific approach is necessary. In-line security mechanisms (e.g. traditional
network IDS utilization) or security tools at the host level (e.g. anti-virus) are not rec-
ommended owing to possible latency impact or the occurrence of single points of failure
along the vital communications path. Further, given the increasing sophistication of attacks,
cyber-security no longer can depend on supervised, pattern-based detection algorithms to
guarantee continuous security monitoring. There needs to be approaches that handle rogue
threats, which provide a suitable balance between maintenance and detection power [23].
1.4 Real-world Attacks
Among the others, the STUXNET worm infection [29] perfectly represents the frailty of the
regulatory systems devoted to control critical infrastructures. Although neither country has
openly admitted responsibility, the worm is believed to be a jointly built American/Israeli
cyberweapon First isolated in mid-June 2010, STUXNET was a computer virus specif-
ically designed for attacking Windows based industrial computers and taking control of
Programmable Logic Controller (PLCs), influencing the behaviour of remote actuators and
leading to instability phenomena or even worse. The paradox is that critical infrastructures
massively rely on newest interconnected (and vulnerable) Information and Communica-
tion Technology (ICT) technologies, while the control equipment is typically old, legacy
software/hardware. Such a combination of factors may lead to very dangerous situations,
exposing the systems to a wide variety of attacks. The lesson the CIIP (Critical Information
Infrastructure Protection) community has learned from the spread of the STUXNET worm is
that, in order to effectively react to a specific low level menace, there is the need to consider
both the global and the local perspectives. In fact, besides obtaining a wider perspective on
the state of the System of Systems, there is the need to increase the intelligence of equipments
and devices that are used to influence the behaviour of the system, such as RTUs, valves, etc.
Taking in mind that such worms can be launched from national intelligence agencies with
vast resources for performing persistent attacks [30], only solutions that combine several
methods can have adequate detection and mitigation performance.
Moreover, as emphasised by several episodes [31], another effective way to paralyse
a SCADA system via cyber attack is to saturate the bandwidth of the carrier used for the
communication (this was, for example, the way in which the SLAMMER worm operated in
2003 to affect the SCADA of two United States (US) utilities and a nuclear power plant).
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Indeed, as emphasised also by the ANSI/ISA.99 (American National Standards Institute/
International Society of Automation), availability is the most crucial attribute of information
security. The lack of timely information to/from the field may cause dramatic consequences
because the field is unable to receive the adequate command, hence even trivial episodes may
provoke dramatic impact, as shown by the US black-out.
In an evaluation of the Mariposa botnet infection in an ICS organisation, the US Depart-
ment of Homeland Security [32, 33] explained that they found that the infection occurred
when an employee used a USB drive to download presentation materials to a corporate laptop.
When the user connected the laptop to the corporate network upon returning to work, the
virus spread to over 100 hosts.
The security of SCADA communications is becoming more complicated because the
decision has been taken to link the SCADA networks with IT networks to allow better
and faster communications. But these new features have increased the threats and risks on
SCADA communications. There are presently no convinced solutions to enforce the security
of SCADA communications in that perspective. The idea to add “intelligence” to the field is
not new; electro-valves for gas pipelines are available on the market that, in the case they
receive a rapid sequence of open-close commands, do not perform them in order to avoid the
consequence of the mechanical shock and EU (European Union) projects such as the FP6
SAFEGUARD and FP7 CRUTIAL (CRitical UTility InfrastructurAL Resilience) and the
SCADA-CSL project have explored the technical feasibility to improve cyber security of
SCADA system by improving the smartness of the field devices. However, until now such
solutions have been completely rejected by Critical Infrastructure (CI) operators because
they fear that local automatic reactions may happen during “normal” activities inducing
catastrophic behaviour.
To overcome such catastrophic vision, and in order to improve the resilience and the
dependability of CIs solutions, like the design and the implementation of alerting Systems
that provide CI operators an efficient tool to support them, must be designed. Such tool could
provide the operators with capabilities to assist them: (i) in the prevention of cyber attacks,
and (ii) in the implementation of consequence containment strategies in case of an attack.
1.5 CockpitCi Project
The CockpitCI project proposes an architecture based on real-time Perimeter Intrusion
Detection System (PIDS), which provides the core cyber-analysis and detection capabilities,
being responsible for continuously assessing and protecting the electronic security perimeter
of each CI. The analysis and detection mechanisms for each PIDS are fed by several field
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adapters and detection agents, deployed within each CI and providing the basic information
from which the ongoing security status of the CI is inferred. The PIDS also encompasses
semi-autonomous reaction capabilities, being able to deploy countermeasures, in line with
predefined security reaction policies.
The CockpitCI PIDS (see Figure 1.2) is structured along the three different zones of
the CI, each one with its own internal security perimeter: the Field Network, SCADA
Process/Operations Network and the IT (Information Technology) Network. This distinction
confers the PIDS the ability to deploy agents and security policies customized to the specific
needs and characteristics of each network scope.
The architecture components are arranged in a two-level architecture with local instances
fine-tuned for each network scope: local correlators perform the first step of correlation,
receiving the events from local detection agents (e.g. Host IDS) on their network scope
and process them accordingly with a set of rules, forwarding significant results to a global
correlation engine. After local correlation, events are sent to the global correlators, which
have access to a broad perspective of the whole infrastructure, covering all network scopes.
This approach provides context separation, also allowing for better efficiency and scalability
for (soft)real time event processing. This architecture was designed to deal with several
attack scenarios, from known threats to rogue events, such as: man-in-the-middle attacks,
device impersonation, non-authorized tampering, worms, trojans, denial-of-service attacks or
flooding, among others. For this purpose, the PIDS is designed in such a way that it integrates
different detection strategies, distributed along different levels, namely:
• Detection agents and field adaptors, including agents, adaptors and extensions for
existing system components, as well as specialized probes and honeypots to be added
to the network which are able to capture behaviour or traffic patterns (as performed
by NIDS – Network IDS components) as well as host (using Host IDS, or antivirus
software) and field device monitoring.
• A distributed multi-zone, multi-level rule-based correlation structure that processes
the information provided by the security sensors, complemented by machine-learning
capabilities, in the form of One-Class Support Vector Machines (OCSVM) anomaly
detection module, based on machine learning.
• Aggressive usage of topology and system-specific detection mechanisms, based on the
fact that the role and behaviour of each system component in an ICS are expected to
be more consistent over time than on other types of networks, analysis components are
fed with knowledge provided by a number of system specific sources, such as topology
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databases, policy databases, and trust-based mechanisms, as well as strategically placed
honeypots.
In the CockpitCI PIDS, computational intelligence is provided by means of the analysis
components, which provide a way to extract information from the data collected by the agent
layer or directly from network traces.
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Fig. 1.2 High-level view of the CockpitCI PIDS architecture
Part of the PIDS that was developed for the purposes of the CockpitCI project, is the
OCSVM module. During the duration of the project two novel OCSVM modules were
developed and tested using datasets from a small-scale testbed that was created, providing
the means to mimic a SCADA system operating both in normal conditions and under the
influence of cyberattacks. Initial tests were conducted in order to evaluate the performance of
the IT-OCSVM mechanism using three types of attacks, namely: network scan, Man-in-the-
Middle (MITM) using ARP spoofing and Denial-of-Service (DoS). The Hybrid Environment
for Development and Validation (HEDVa) that was designed by the Israeli Electric Company
for the development and validation of CIs as well as security research projects, was used in a
later stage in order to implement the attack use cases for the PIDS validation effort.
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The following chapters describe in detail the two proposed IDS systems that are based on
the OCSVM mechanism, namely the IT-OCSVM and the K-OCSVM. Both systems that are
novel were developed by the candidate under the supervision of Professor Jiang during his
work as research fellow in University of Surrey in 2014. Initially the K-OCSVM method
was developed, but requirements about fast reaction of the IDS along with high accuracy,
led to the creation of the second method, namely IT-OCSVM. This new method performed
well both in terms of time and accuracy, was easily integrated in the PIDS and attracted the
attention of the research community (Interview of the candidate by IET Electronics Letters
(http://digital-library.theiet.org/content/journals/10.1049/el.2014.4062), keynote speech to
ICAIDM 2014 conference, invited talk to CN group of TU WIEN in 2017 etc).

Chapter 2
Related Work
SCADA systems that link facilities like oil and gas pipelines or water distribution and waste
water collection systems might have been designed to be open, robust, and easily operated
and repaired, but they are not necessarily secure. Cyber-attacks against these systems are
considered extremely dangerous for CI (Critical Infrastructures) operation and must be
addressed in a specific way [22]. Intrusion Detection Systems can be used in order to identify
an attack and initiate proper alerts that may help take appropriate actions.
Artificial Intelligence, machine learning and data mining are commnly used in every day
applications. From an intrusion detection perspective, analysts can apply machine learning,
data mining and pattern recognition algorithms to distinguish between normal and malicious
traffic [34]. Artificial Intelligence (AI) is about improving algorithms by employing novel
problem solving techniques. AI systems integrate several tasks such as learning or gaining the
ability to perform tasks from simple or complex examples and extensive training. Classifier
systems attempt to learn how to classify future examples from a set of training data. Neural
networks are characterized by highly connected networks which are trained on a set of
data counting on the hypothesis that the network will correctly classify future examples. In
literature, numbers of anomaly detection systems are developed based on many different
machine learning techniques. For example, some studies use single learning techniques, such
as neural networks, genetic algorithms, support vector machines, etc. As the amount of data
that need to be monitored and analyzed, in real time, is huge, data mining techniques are
used. Data mining is the process of discovering patterns in large data sets involving methods
at the intersection of machine learning and artificial intelligence. There is a significant
overlap between machine learning and data mining. These two terms are commonly confused
because they often employ the same methods although the former focuses on classification
and prediction and the latter on the discovery of previously unknown patters [35]. Modern
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intrusion detection systems that can cope with zero days attacks in an efficient and accurate
way rely on artificial intelligence, machine learning and data mining techniques.
2.1 Intrusion Detection Systems
Intrusion refers to actions geared towards challenging the integrity, discretion or accessibility
of a resource [36]. Whereas intrusion protection pertains to the monitoring of events that
occur in a computer system and analysing them so as to detect any possible intrusion [37].
An intrusion detection system (IDS) refers to the operation of intrusion detection principles
and mechanisms across a network. It can have both software and hardware components
running on host machines that track user activities. That is, it can have programs searching for
potential insider threats to the host as well as distributed agents, that by scrutinizing network
traffic, can detect threats from outsiders. The purpose of an IDS is to warn administrators
about any suspect activity and in sometimes it even deals with an attack. In comparison to
other types of security, e.g. firewalls, control of access or encryption, for which the purpose
is one of securing the computer system, IDSs are tasked with detecting attackers that have
already entered its internal network. Hence, it is strongly advised that the intrusion prevention
and intrusion detection security practices be utilised in tandem, as this will enhance system
security.
In the past, administrators manually controlled intrusion detectors (IDs). They monitored
every activity on a console and identified inconsistencies. However, this was not effective and
resulted in a high volume of errors, particularly as the amount of network activity steadily
increased. Log file readers were developed to address this, which allowed for rapid detection
of irregularities and unauthorised access. Audit log IDs introduced during the initial stages
were a type of forensics. Whilst ID was post analysis and analysis of intrusions and changes
to the structure of the system were detected some time after the event. This involved a
long-winded process, being subject to error, particularly when system usage was heavy [38].
Work was carried out in the 1980s and 1990s to make IDSs more robust, with a solution
being provided by Denning [39]. They created an IDS that could review audit data in real
time, which thus was the first time that attacks could be pre-empted [37]. With the coming
of the technological age, the IT security market expanded rapidly and IDSs were developed
further and became widely available. Features, such as new alert modes, updating to attack
pattern definitions, dedicated user friendly interfaces and methods that stopped identified
attacks immediately were added. As various new attacks were generated across the web,
such as the millennium bug, it soon became obvious that continuous innovation of security
systems would be needed to protect computing networks.
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There are two principle categories of IDSs and a compound one: anomaly, signature and
hybrid/compound detection systems [40]. An IDS works using models to establish whether a
series of actions can be classed in terms of good or bad and thus potentially be an intrusion.
Anomaly detection systems are aimed at understanding the behaviour of the network traffic,
whilst misuse detection systems compare the present situation with recognised misbehaviour
patterns.
2.1.1 Anomaly Detection Systems
The decision making process in these systems is determined by taking into account the system
or user’s normal profile. The detector establishes normal behaviour for the observed object
of interest (application, user, resource usage etc.), subsequently flagging up the proportion of
suspicious activity and taking appropriate action [41]. Because no previous knowledge of the
intrusion is required this type of detector is effective for unknown attacks [42]. Nevertheless,
it has a high rate of false positives and is incapable of providing details about attacks [43].
Lemaire et al [44] point out that, traditionally, intrusion data is inspected by human
analysts who evaluate the alerts and take decisions accordingly. Machine learning, it is
argued, has the capability to gather knowledge about new data and make predictions about
the new data based on the knowledge of previous data, leading to a far more efficient self-
learning process. This sentiment is echoed by Garitano [45] and Larkin et al [20] who note
that whilst anomaly-based IDSs are not usually used on traditional IT networks because
of their dynamic environment, the predictable traffic patterns of an ICS lend themselves to
such an approach. However, this concept is based on the premise that ICS traffic is, indeed,
predictable.
2.1.2 Misuse Detection
These systems, also called signature based detection systems, utilise patterns of known
attacks or critical points so as to identify and match recognised intrusions. They provide
much greater accuracy, also being able to identify variants of known attacks. Moreover, this
type of IDS can provide useful diagnostics about an attack in terms of why an alarm has
been triggered [46]. Nonetheless, there are some drawbacks, such as lacking the capacity to
identify novel intrusions. Recently, a combination of misuse and anomaly systems have been
deployed to improve the rates of both recognised and unrecognised intrusions as well as to
lower the rate of false positives [47]. However, for the sake of convenience, most commercial
systems only deploy misuse detection systems.
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2.1.3 Clustering
Clustering refers to unsupervised learning algorithms which do not require pre-labeled data
to extract rules for grouping similar data instances. When using clustering scholars follow
one of the three following assumptions:
1. Purity assumption: we can create clusters of only normal data, and thus any data
that don’t fit into one cluster are considered anomalous. This assumption is only valid
when dealing with testbed scenarios and cannot be applied in real environments.
2. Robustness assumption: we can create clusters that contain both normal and anoma-
lous data, but in this occasion using distance metrics we can spot anomalous data since
they lie far away from the centroids [48]. This assumption produces false positives
especially in attack free scenarios.
3. Frequency assumption: we create clusters of various sizes and the small ones contain
anomalous data since attacks are not the rule but rather the exception. This assumption
is not valid when dealing with DoS or DDoS attacks when the volume of malicious
packets is high.
Using all these assumptions and by calibrating several parameters and thresholds, scholars
have managed to develop IDSs that are based on clustering techniques and that can perform
well under several attack scenarios [49–51]. On the other hand such assumptions make
these methods inappropriate for producing high accurate alarms, when dealing with several
attacks simultaneously and when having to deal with high volumes of data in real time [52].
Exploiting the basic characteristic of clustering that is to group together similar things and
having as one of the basic objectives to create and IDS that doesn’t overwhelm the medium
with alarm messages, in the core of the two IDSs that are presented in this thesis lies the
K-means method.
2.1.4 Data Mining for Intrusion Detection
The increasing deployment of data mining approaches has resulted in the creation of a whole
host of algorithms for database analysis, machine learning and pattern identification, all of
which can be utilised as an IDS. For instance, there is a range of algorithms available for
mining audit data. To construct a model, these algorithms have to begin with analyis of
the available data so as to identify any patterns or trends. The appropriate models are then
created with the optimal parameters identified from the outcomes of the initial analysis The
process of implementing an IDS through data mining is as follows: data collection, data
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selection, preprocessing, transformation, data mining, evaluation and reporting, all of which
were carried in the two proposed methods that are presented and analyzed in the following
Chapters.
2.1.5 Support Vector Machines
SVMs utilise a method for classing data rapidly. First, training data are used to develop a
model, which is then utilised to categorise new data. SVMs employ a kernel function for
mapping data onto a higher dimensional feature space, whereby hyperplanes can be used
to separate the different categories. Iteration is deployed to identify the best hyperplane for
category distinction, which has the greatest margin between it and the data points that are
nearest. The data points coinciding with this margin are named the support vectors.
Whilst it is feasible to have multiple classes for data allocation, the interest here lies in
One-Class SVMS (OCSVM), which simply decides whether new data belongs to a single
class or not. This gives it the capability of identifying previously unknown, suspicious
behaviour and, rather than categorising it, just recognises it as not being good. Given the
lack of any data points from another category, the approach takes the origin as the class 1
perfect vector and the optimal distance is between the origin and where the data point has
left the category. It is essential to elicit appropriate values so as to obtain optimal outcomes
with this model. This process is frequently improved by the use of other machine learning
techniques to determine optimum values for the algorithm that can be obtained by utilising
machine learning methods [53, 54].
2.1.6 Discussion
There has been a considerable amount of work undertaken regarding SCADA intrusion and
anomaly detection, including Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) [55], or Distributed IDSs
[56, 57, 57] device-level anomaly detection [58, 59] and classification [60], IDSs solutions
combining network traces and physical process control data [61], detection based on traffic
and protocol models [62] [63–65] and approaches based on machine-learning techniques
[66, 67], just to mention a few. However, not all solutions are equally feasible: for instance,
device-level anomaly detection requires adding hardware mechanisms for probing. Also,
detecting attacks targeting loss of process visibility, such as Man-in-the-Middle (MITM)
or process-level attacks (which attempt to disturb the SCADA process) is out of scope for
several of these proposals.
Among other approaches, neural networks, support vector machines, K-nearest neighbor
(KNN) and the hidden Markov model can be used for intrusion detection. While existing
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Table 2.1 Differences between IT and CPS Intrusion Detection [6]
An IT IDS monitors host or network-level
activity (e.g., an HTTP request or a web
server
A CPS IDS monitors the physical processes
(and hence the laws of physics) that govern
behaviour of physical devices that make
certain behaviours more likely to be seen
than others.
An IT IDS monitors user-triggered
activities, leading to unacceptably high
false-positive rates due to the
unpredictability of user behaviours.
A CPS IDS monitors activities that are
frequently automated and time driven in a
closed-loop setting, thus providing some
regularity and predictability for behaviour
monitoring
An IT IDS deals with mostly
non-zero-day attacks rendering
knowledge-based detection effective.
A CPS IDS deals with zero-day or highly
sophisticated attacks, rendering
knowledge-based detection ineffective.
An IT IDS often does not have to deal
with legacy components, making
behaviour specification of the physical
processes governing legacy components
unnecessary.
A CPS IDS often must deal with legacy
technology, making behaviour-specification
detection an effective technique by precisely
specifying the physical processes governing
the behaviour of legacy components.
signature-based network IDSs, such as Snort or Suricata can be effective in SCADA envi-
ronments, they require specific customization for such a purpose [68, 69]. Also, they are
not effective against rogue threats for which known patterns or signatures are not known.
OCSVM principles have shown great potential in the area of anomaly detection [70], being a
natural extension of the support vector algorithm in the case of unlabeled data, especially
for the detection of outliers. As stated in [71] there is a need for developing a robust, and
preferably real-time IDS technique that can work in unsupervised mode and have a high
detection accuracy.
Mitchell et al. in in [6] and Cook et al. in [72] explore the viability of traditional IT secu-
rity mechanisms in Cyber Physical Systems, such as ICS, and considers their effectiveness in
supporting ICS cybersecurity incident response. Based on the findings in [6] it is obvious
that IDSs that are designed for CPS systems differ compared to those that are developed for
traditional IT (See Table 2.1).
The single-class categorisation is a particular case of a two class classification problem,
whereby data from onle one class are present, known as the target class. A second category,
called the outlier class, is sampled very sparingly, or maybe not at all. The data here
indicate abnormal behaviour and hence, the possibility of an intrusion; OCSVM [66] has a
number of positive attributes when processing data in a SCADA environment. The one-class
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Support Vector Machine (OCSVM) [73] possesses several advantages for processing SCADA
environment data and automates SCADA performance monitoring, which can be highlighted
as follows:
• Regarding monitoring of SCADA performance the difference between what is normal
and what is not might not be clear to the operators. Since OCSVM needs no data
signatures, data for constructing the detection model it is very effective for identifying
intrusion in SCADA environments.
• Because no previous information regarding anticipated types of attack is required,
OCSVM can identify both recognised and unrecognised (new) intrusions.
• In reality, training data obtained in a SCADA environment can contain samples of
noise, which most attack detection approaches are extremely sensitive to. OCSVM is
robust to these samples during the process of training.
• The user can control the configuration of the algorithm in relation to the proportion of
anticipated anomalies.
• OCSVM detectors are quick enough to perform online with SCADA performance
monitoring, owing to the low computation time.
• Typical monitoring of data of SCADA systems consists of several attributes and
OCSVM is capable of handling multiple-attributed data.
Based on this analysis and the need for an IDS that can be accurate, deal with novel
attacks and work in real-time two novel methods that were based on the OCSVM mechanism
were developed. In real-time systems, in addition to fast response and accuracy, limited
communication between detection modules is also desirable. By sending an explicit message
for every anomaly detected, the intrusion detection mechanism will flood the medium with
messages that will cause a delay in the communication between entities in the SCADA system.
Moreover, since the detection mechanism needs to be sited at several locations in the SCADA
system in order to recognize the intrusion near the origin, the communication overhead
caused by the detection mechanism is further increased. One solution is the addition of a
control channel, whereby these messages can be communicated without affecting the system’s
performance, but this is not always feasible. For this reason, the IT-OCSVM mechanism that
was the second and more successful solution presented, includes an aggregation mechanism
that groups initial alerts and sends a limited number of messages reporting the fault/intrusion
accurately and on time. Both IT-OCSVM and K-OCSVM, that was the initial mechanism
developed, are presented in the following chapters. Both mechanisms were developed in
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order to work real-time in collaboration with other detection agents, as a part of a Perimeter
IDS.
This commentary presents two novel IDSs systems that were developed under the scope
of a PIDS. These mechanisms were developed in order to overcome the shortcomings of all
current (back in 2014) methods, in terms of accuracy, overhead and efficient countering of
zero days attacks. The IT-OCSVM method, which is the improved and final IDS method
produced was evaluated under realistic scenarios and was found to be very efficient in terms
of time overhead and accuracy under all kinds of attacks, making it a central part of the
PIDS. In Appendix A, the articles that describe the methodology, the evaluation and the
main findings of the two aforementioned methods along with the integration of the later
into the PIDS that was implemented as part of the CockpitCI project are listed. The current
commentary presents both methods, the need that led to the design and implementation of
these novel techniques and the evaluation of later under realistic attack scenarios.
Chapter 3
Proposed Methods
3.1 K-OCSVM Idea
OCSVM principles have shown great potential in the area of anomaly detection [70, 74, 75].
IDS can provide active detection and automated responses during intrusions [76]. Several
extensions of the OCSVM method have been introduced lately [77, 78]. OCSVM, similar
to other one-class classifiers e.g. GDE[79], PGA [80], suffer from false positive and over
fitting situations. Intrusion detection systems (IDS) fail to deal with all kinds of attacks,
while on the other hand, false alarms that are arisen from high sensitive IDS lead to high
economic risks. A big number of false alarms fired from the IDS gives the impression that
IDS technology itself is fundamentally flawed and that there is no possibility for a true false
positive to exist. That way the IDS is ignored from the operator and the system is vulnerable
to real attacks.For example when deploying a network based IDS, changes made to system
files from an unauthorized user who uses the system console, goes unnoticed.
For the OCSVM with an Radial Basis Function (RBF) kernel, two parameters σ and ν
need to be carefully selected in order to obtain the optimal classification result. Parameter
ν sets an upper bound on the fraction of outliers (training examples regarded out-of-class)
and, it is also a lower bound on the number of training examples used as Support Vectors.
Parameter σ denotes the width of the Gaussian kernel (how tight the boundary fits over the
training data). OCSVM, similar to other one-class classifiers suffer from false positives
and over fitting. The former is a situation that occurs when the classifier fires an alarm in
the absence of any real anomaly in the system and happens when the parameter σ has too
large value. The latter is the situation when a model begins to memorize training data rather
than learning to generalize from the trend and it shows up when the parameter σ is given a
relatively small value [81].
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A common strategy is to separate the data set into two parts, of which one is considered
unknown. The prediction accuracy obtained from the unknown set more precisely reflects the
performance on classifying an independent data set. An improved version of this procedure
is known as cross-validation. Cross-validation is a model validation technique for assessing
how the results of a statistical analysis will generalize to an independent data set. It is mainly
used in settings where the goal is prediction, and one wants to estimate how accurately a
predictive model will perform in practice.
In k-fold cross-validation [82, 83], the training set is divided into k subsets of equal size.
Sequentially one subset is tested using the classifier trained on the remaining k .. 1 subsets .
Thus, each instance of the whole training set is predicted once so the cross-validation accuracy
is the percentage of data which are correctly classified. The cross-validation procedure can
prevent the over fitting problem.
Using an ensemble of decision mechanisms with different parameters, is another method
to have an optimal result. An ensemble of classifiers [84] is a set of classifiers whose
individual decisions are combined in some way, in order to provide more trusted final
decisions. Ensemble systems of classifiers are widely used for intrusion detection in networks.
Classifier ensemble design aims to include mutually complementary individual classifiers
which are characterized by high diversity, either in terms of classifier structure [85], internal
parameters [86] or classifier inputs [87].
Unnthorsson et al. [88] proposed another method to select parameters for the OCSVM.
In their method, ν was first set to a user-specified allowable fraction of misclassification of
the target class (e.g. 1% or 5%). With ν fixed, σ is adjusted until a classification accuracy
of 1−ν is obtained. The obtained ν and σ combination can then be used in the OCSVM
classification.
In this subsection we present a novel method that is based on the combination of the
OCSVM method with recursive K-means clustering separating the real from false alarms in
real time and with no pre-selection of parameters σ and ν . The proposed method is a natural
extension of the support vector algorithm to the case of unlabeled data, especially for the
detection of outliers. The novel K-OCSVM mechanism is trained offline by network traces,
after the attributes are extracted from the network dataset. Output of the detection module
is communicated to the system by IDMEF files that contain information about the source,
time and severity of the intrusion. After the execution of the K-OCSVM method, only severe
alerts are communicated to the system by IDMEF files that contain information about the
source, destination, protocol and time of the intrusion. The main feature of the K-OCSVM
module is that it can perform anomaly detection in a time-efficient way, with good accuracy
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and low overhead. A detailed description and evaluation of the K-OSCVM method can be
found in [67, 89, 90].
3.2 K-OCSVM Implementation
The proposed K-OCSVM combines the well known OCSVM classifier with the RBF kernel
with a recursive K-means clustering module. Figure 3.1 illustrates the procedure of intrusion
detection of our proposed K-OCSVM model.
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1 cluster 
Extract features 
OCSVM with default parameters 
K- means clustering 
Read 
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IDMEF 
K-OCSVM 
Fig. 3.1 K-OCSVM module
The OCSVM classifier runs with default parameters and the outcome consists of all
possible outliers. These outliers are clustered using the k-means clustering method with 2
clusters, where the initial means of the clusters are the maximum and the minimum negative
values returned by the OCSVM module. From the two clusters that are created from the
K-means clustering, the one that is closer to the maximum negative value (severe alerts) is
used as input in the next call of the K-means clustering. This procedure is repeated until all
outcomes are put in the same cluster or the divided set is big enough when compared to the
initial one, according to the threshold parameter kthres.
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The K-means clustering method divides the outcomes according to their values and those
outcomes with the most negative values are kept. That way, after the completion of this
recursive procedure, only the most severe alerts are communicated from the K-OCSVM. The
division of the data need no previous knowledge about the values of the outcomes which
may vary from -0.1 to -160 depending on the values assigned to the parameters σ and ν . The
method can find the most important/possible outliers for any given values of parameters σ
and ν .
As it shown in a later Chapter, the K-OCSVM method performs well in terms of low
overhead and has good accuracy. K-OCSVM can detect all important variations in network
traffic that may constitute an attack, but it achieves this by ignoring small fluctuations that
may obscure low probing attacks. For this reason, and based on the high requirements of the
CockPitCi project, a novel method that achieved both high accuracy and low overhead was
developed. This new method, namely IT-OCSVM, is described in the next section.
3.3 IT-OCSVM Idea
Behavioral analysis is the
Social network analysis (SNA) can be used in order to discover security policy breaches in
a network and refers to the use of network theory to analyze social networks. That is, it views
social relationships in terms of network theory, consisting of nodes, representing individual
actors within the network, and ties which represent relationships between the individuals,
such as friendships, kinships, organizations and sexual relationships. By using comparative
metrics of a network’s structure during normal and abnormal operation, we can discover
security policy breaches. One can assume that network communication between nodes,
constitutes a social network of users and their applications, so the appropriate methods of
social network formal analysis can be applied [91]. In on-line social systems perpetrators of
malicious behavior often display patterns of interaction that are quite different from regular
users, which can be identified through the application of anomaly detection techniques.
Thus, in accordance [92], network anomalies can be defined as patterns of interaction
that significantly differ from the norm and in order to capture the appropriate patterns of
interaction, specific aspects of entities’ behavior are used (e.g. email analysis).
Deviation from the normal protocol operation in communication networks has received
considerable attention from the research community in recent years. A malicious node
may use the vulnerabilities of the system architecture to perform different kinds of attacks.
Hence, considering network reliability it is necessary to develop efficient techniques to detect
misbehaving clients in a timely manner and the correlation coefficients between entities can
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effectively detect malicious nodes [93]. Similar to this, in a SCADA system, individual
entities demonstrate a quite different communication behavior when infected, in terms of
mean packet generation frequency (traffic burst), protocol distribution or interaction pattern.
Discovering anomalies in the context of a network system is a challenging issue due to
the complexity of the environment and the different nature of the induced attacks. Regarding
node behavior related decisions it makes sense to ask more than one decision mechanism,
since this practice assures a more trusted final decision. Ensemble systems of classifiers
are widely used for intrusion detection in networks [94]. These aim to include mutually
complementary individual classifiers, which are characterized by high diversity in terms of
classifier structure [85], internal parameters [86] or classifier inputs[87].
As stated in the previous chapter one of the main objectives when implementing an
IDS, along with fast response and high accuracy is low overhead. Since the solution of
adding a control channel that is dedicated to the messages that are produced from the IDS,
an aggregation mechanism that groups initial alerts and sends a limited number of messages
reporting the fault/intrusion accurately and on time was also developed.
The present chapter presents a recently proposed intrusion detection mechanism, namely
the IT-OCSVM [95], against the baseline OCSVM method. The mechanism uses a central
OCSVM and a cluster of automatically produced ones, one for each source that induces
signifficant traffic in the system, an embedded ensemble mechanism, social metrics, an
aggregation method and a K-means clustering procedure that categorizes aggregated alerts.
The mechanism runs in a distributed way and produces dedicated IDMEF (Intrusion Detection
Message Exchange Format) messages that report the severity of the attack detected. The
proposed mechanism is incorporated in a distributed IDS communicating with other detection
and management components of the system.
3.4 IT-OCSVM Implementation
The main purpose of the IT-OCSVM detection mechanism is to perform anomaly detection
in a time-efficient way, with good accuracy and low overhead, within a temporal window
adequate for the nature of SCADA systems. In order to achieve the aforementioned goals
several operation stages need to be carried out (See Figure 3.2).
• Pre-processing of raw input data in order to feed the IT-OCSVM module. The attributes
in the raw data of the testbed contain all forms: continuous, discrete, and symbolic,
with significantly varying resolution and ranges. Most pattern classification methods
are not able to process data in such a format. Hence, pre-processing is required before
pattern classification models can be built. This consists of two steps: the first involves
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Fig. 3.2 Architecture of detection mechanism
mapping symbolic-valued attributes to numeric-valued attributes and the second is
implementing scaling. Different pre-processing techniques are used based on the
characteristics of each feature type [96].
• Selection of the most appropriate features for the training of the IT-OCSVM model.
These features are divided into content and time based features. Since the majority of
DoS and probing attacks may use hundreds of packets, time-based features are mostly
used.
• Creation of cluster of OCSVM models that are trained on discrete sources. There
are many slow probing attacks that scan the hosts using much larger intervals, thus
being able to merge into the overall traffic in the network. As a consequence, these
attacks cannot be detected using derived time-based features and in order to capture
them, the raw data after arriving in the module is split into different datasets according
to the sender of the packet. An OCSVM module is created and trained for each split
dataset. The cluster of split OCSVMs run in parallel with the central OCSVM and
produce errors targeted to the specific source.
It is important to mention that a split OCSVM is not created for each source, but only
for those sources that produce high traffic in the network during the training period. In
order to separate significant nodes a threshold Ppackets is used and every source that
produces a number of packets over this threshold during the training period is marked
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as a significant node. If during the testing period a source is showing big activity, while
not being marked as significant, a medium alarm is fired for it.
• Testing of the traffic dataset that contains malicious attacks. Based on the models
created from the training phase the new dataset is tested against normal patterns. Each
OCSVM module returns a function f that takes the value +1 in a region capturing
normal data points (i.e. for events implying normal behaviour of the SCADA system)
and takes a negative value elsewhere (i.e. for events implying abnormal behaviour of
the SCADA system).
• Ensemble of classifiers The initial outcomes of the different OCSVM modules are
combined by the ensemble based mechanism that uses mean majority voting.
• Social analysis Social network analysis is executed based on the network traces and
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient is used in order to add weight to alerts produced
from different sources.
• Fusion of the information Due to the possible existence of multiple anomalies in a
SCADA system, the outcomes of the different models are gathered and classified in
terms of importance. This importance is derived through aggregation and k-means
clustering of the outputs.
• Communication of the mechanism. In order to cooperate with other components of
the IDS the mechanism sends IDMEF files. The created files describe the nature of the
alert, in terms of importance, the position in the system, time etc.
A more detailed description of the proposed method and its evaluation after the deploy-
ment in realistic SCADA systems can be found in [97, 95, 23]. In the next subsection the
social analysis module that is embeded in the IT-OCSVM method is described.
3.5 Summary
This chapter presents the two novel methods, namely the K-OCSVM and the IT-OCSVM.
The detection mechanisms, which run in a distributed way, can be used in large SCADA
networks with no additional modifications.
The main feature of the K-OCSVM module is that it can perform anomaly detection in
a time-efficient way, with good accuracy and low overhead. Low overhead is an important
evaluation metric of a distributed detection module that is scattered in a real-time system,
since frequent communication of IDMEF files from detection agents degrade the performance
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of the SCADA network. On the other hand, since sometimes these fluctuations obscure real
attacks, better methods that can classify them, instead of ignoring them was needed. This
need led to the development of the second method, namely the IT-OCSVM.
Speaking for the IT-OCSVM, the combination of social network analysis metrics with
machine learning classification techniques, enhances the performance of the detection mech-
anism and improves accuracy for all the simulation scenarios investigated. Moreover, the
aggregation procedure embedded in the proposed mechanism decreases the overhead of the
IT-OCSVM and makes it easily incorporable in a soft real time system. That is, the method
produces a small amount of final alerts and manages to detect all the simulated attacks.
Chapter 4
Evaluation
In this chapter we present the different testbeds that were used in order to evaluate the
performance of the proposed methods. Also all the experiments that were conducted, offline
and online, and the several performance metrics are presented and critically analyzed.
4.1 Testbeds and Experiments
4.1.1 Small-scale SCADA System
The testbed architecture mimics a small-scale SCADA system, comprising the operations and
field networks, which include a Human-Machine Interface Station (for process monitoring),
a managed switch (with port monitoring capabilities for network traffic capture), and two
Programmable Logic Controller Units, for process control.
Three kinds of attacks are evaluated:
• Network scan attack In a typical network scan attack, the attacker uses TCP/FIN
scans to determine if ports are closed to the target machine; closed ports answer with
RST packets while open ports discard the FIN message. FIN packets blend with
background noise on a link and are hard to detect.
• ARP cache spoofing - MITM attack ARP cache spoofing is a technique where an
attacker sends fake ARP messages. The aim is to associate the attacker’s MAC address
with the IP address of another host, thus causing any traffic meant for that IP to be sent
to the attacker instead. The attacker could choose to inspect the packets, modify data
before forwarding (man-in-the-middle attack) or launch a denial of service attack by
causing some of the packets to be dropped.
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Fig. 4.1 Architecture of the testbed
• DoS attack Network flood refers to the situation where the attacker floods the connec-
tion with the PLC by sending SYN packets.
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4.1.2 Hybrid Test Bed (HTB)
The Hybrid Environment for Development and Validation (HEDVa) was designed by the
Israeli Electric Company for the development and validation of CIs as well as security
research projects [23], being used to implement the attack use cases for the PIDS validation
effort. Its architecture (see Figure 4.2) constitutes a hybrid approach, because of the existence
of real/physical SCADA and network/telecom infrastructure components, which are used to
implement a simulation model of the electric grid elements.
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Fig. 4.2 HEDVa networking architecture
The CockpitCI emulated HEDVa scenario corresponds to an energy distribution grid, as
shown in Figure 4.3. Its implementation required the development and testing of different
modeling techniques, also including related key performance indicators, fine-tuned with
data from production scenarios. Grid elements such as breakers and feeders are controlled
by real PLCs in a simulation model, with voltage and current values for segments being
calculated accordingly using a mathematical model of the physical grid. In case of failure,
the scenario is reconfigured accordingly with the operator’s Fault Isolation and Service
Restoration procedures.
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Fig. 4.3 HEDVa grid scenario, with breakers and substation feeders
From an implementation standpoint, the HEDVa scenario makes use of real SCADA and
NMS elements, physical components of electrical and telecom infrastructure and emulated
elements of electrical and telecom infrastructure, providing a test ground for the CockpitCI
PIDS (see Figure 4.2). The Hybrid testbed architecture mimics a medium-scale SCADA sys-
tem, comprising the operations and field networks and including Human-Machine Interface
Stations (for process monitoring), six managed switches (with port monitoring capabilities,
for network traffic capture), and several Programmable Logic Controller Units, for process
control. The initial dataset consists of over 3 million rows, each representing a packet sent
in the system, capturing network of several days. The dataset is split in 65 smaller ones of
50.000 rows. The datasets that were used contain several attacks.
4.2 K-OCSVM Method Evaluation
We evaluate the performance of the method using data from a testbed that mimics a small-
scale SCADA system and from a Hybrid testbed of a medium sized SCADA system. The
parameters used for the evaluation of the performance of K-OCSVM are listed in Table 4.1.
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Parameter Range of Values Default value
σ 0.1 - 0.0001 0.007
ν 0.002 - 0.05 0.01
kthresh 2 - 3 2
Table 4.1 Evaluation Parameters
4.2.1 Testbed Scenario
The second trial is conducted off line with the use of two datasets extracted from the testbed
that we described earlier.
In Table 4.2 we show the number of alert messages (IDMEF) sent from OCSVM and K-
OCSVM respectively. From this table it is shown how parameters σ ,ν affect the performance
of OCSVM for the testbed scenario. While for the same network trace file OCSVM produces
from 10529 to 10704 alert messages according to the values of the parameters, K-OCSVM
produces the same 120 alert messages. All the reported attacks are concerning the DoS attack
that creates the biggest fluctuation in the network traffic.
Parameter σ Parameter ν K-OCSVM OCSVM
0.007 0.002 120 10529
0.007 0.01 120 10703
0.007 0.005 120 10584
0.0001 0.01 120 10602
0.1 0.01 120 10704
Table 4.2 Performance evaluation of K-OCSVM and OCSVM for Kthres = 2
4.2.2 Hybrid Testbed Scenario
The third trial is conducted off line with the use of large datasets extracted from a Hybrid
Testbed (HT B) scenario. Both OCSVM and K-OCSVM are trained and tested with these
datasets, using cross validation. The mean number of alert messages sent by the two modules
is shown in Table 4.3. The datasets that were used contain several attacks, but the ones
presented in this subsection contain only data from a normal operation of the HT B
Using real datasets of a medium sized HTB SCADA system the performance of the
proposed K-OCSVM method is very stable compared to a simple OCSVM under the same
configuration. This behavior is very promising since K-OCSVM method has a very low false
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Parameter σ Parameter ν K-OCSVM OCSVM
0.007 0.002 1 - 2 40
0.007 0.01 1 - 2 207
0.007 0.005 1 - 2 105
0.0001 0.01 1 - 2 85
0.1 0.01 1 - 2 271
Table 4.3 Performance evaluation of K-OCSVM and OCSVM for Kthres = 2
alarm rate (lower than 0.02 %) while at the same time the overhead induced by the method is
negligible.
Computational Cost and Time Overhead
Complexity of an intrusion detection system can be attributed to hardware, software and
operation factors. For simplicity, it is usually estimated as the computing time required to
perform classification of the dataset and output the final alarms. In order to evaluate the
complexity of the proposed method, we calculate the execution time and compare it to a
simple OCSVM module. The evaluation is conducted on a PC with Intel core 2 duo 1.7 Mhz
CPU, 2GB main memory, 80GB hard disk 7200 rpm hard disk and Microsoft Windows 7
64bit. In Figure 4.4 we represent the time performance of the method compared to a simple
OCSVM module for the testbed scenario.
According to Figure 4.4 execution time of the proposed K-OCSVM is slightly bigger
compared to a simple OCSVM method. The performance gap is around 5% to 10% for all
the datasets used in the simulation. Based on these observations we conclude that the system,
performs a classiffication in a comparable time to that of a simple OCSVM classifier, and it
thus can be adopted in soft real-time applications. We have to mention that the performance
evaluation which is conducted in this subsection, does not include the time that each detection
mechanism needs in order to create and disseminate IDMEF messages. It is evident that the
OCSVM classifer, compared to the proposed K-OCSVM, needs significant additional time
in order to send all the detected alarms.
4.3 IT-OCSVM Method Evaluation
We evaluate the performance of the method using data from a testbed that mimics a small-
scale SCADA system and from a Hybrid testbed of a medium sized SCADA system.
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Fig. 4.4 Computational cost for the testbed scenario
4.3.1 Testbed Scenario
IT-OCSVM is evaluated using datasets extracted from a testbed that mimics a small scale
SCADA system under normal and malicious operation. The evaluation of the proposed
method attests the superiority of the new structure in terms of accuracy, false alarm rate and
system overhead. The trial is conducted off line with the use of two datasets extracted from
the testbed (Figure 4.1). The parameters used during evaluation of the proposed IT-OCSVM
detection method are shown in table 4.4.
Table 4.4 Evaluation parameters
IndependentParamater Default value
ν 0.001
σ 0.01
Ppackets − (No o f split OCSV Ms) 1100 − (5)
Ensemble mechanism Weighted sum value
k−means 2 stages
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This subsection describes the performance of the proposed OCSVM based intrusion
detection algorithm for the simulated data. During the testing period several attack scenarios
are simulated in the testbed, which include: a network scan, a network flood and an MITM
attack. Since the attacks are performed during different time periods we divide the testing
dataset into several smaller ones, each containing a different attack. The testing data consists
of normal and attack data and the composition of the data sets is as follows:
• Testing set-A’ : 1 - 5000: Normal data
• Testing set-B’ : 5000 - 10000: Normal data + Arp spoofing attack + Network scan
• Testing set-C’ : 10000 - 25000: Normal data + Flooding DoS attack + Network scan
• Testing set-D’ : 25000 - 41000: Normal data + MITM attack
Layer 2/3/4 Attacks
These scenarios correspond to malicious activities targeting the SCADA network resources
associated to the data-link (2), network (3) and transport layers (4) of the OSI model. For
this category, two validation use cases were chosen: a FIN/SYN Scan and a SYN Flooding.
A port scan is a typical first step for an attacker to obtain information about the network’s
hosts and its topology, using techniques such as SYN, ACK or FIN scans (among others).
This attack was validated with the use of SYN and FIN probes (see Figure 4.5) to devices on a
network scope, to scan for open TCP/IP ports. The latter also being known as “stealth scans”,
as some firewalls may log them SYN (“half-open”) attempts to restricted ports. Moreover, a
FIN packet sent to a closed port on certain hosts (mostly UNIX-based platforms and most
PLC/devices) will pass undetected, generating a RST response or being ignored for an open
port. Figure 4.5 illustrates such a scenario, where an attacker sends a series of FIN or SYN
probes (green flows) to devices on a network scope and waits for the responses.
The SYN flooding Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack abuses TCP connections, by sending
a high volume of SYN packets to the PLC/RTU. This creates a large number of half-open
connections on the target device, leading to resource exhaustion and the inability to answer
new requests.
SCADA Protocol and Process-level Attacks
SCADA protocols can be specifically targeted by corruption, interception or tampering
attacks. These can potentially lead to a loss of confidentiality, visibility, or device connectivity,
also providing support to implement process-aware attacks, thus compromising safety and
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Fig. 4.5 TCP FIN scan
security. A Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack using Address Resolution Protocol (ARP)
poisoning was chosen as the validation use case for this category, exercising protocol and
process-level detection capabilities. A MITM allows for a third-party to become involved
in the middle of a communication stream, while remaining unnoticed, eventually taking
advantage of process-level knowledge to manipulate SCADA parameters. The MITM use
case starts with an intruder host within the Control Network sending unrequested ARP replies
to poison the targets’ ARP caches and hijack the Modbus TCP protocol flows between the
HMI 1 system and the PLCs; this allows for the attacker to eavesdrop communications and
gather information about the SCADA network and the process. Afterwards, the attacker will
use the previously gathered information to craft a scripted real-time simulator using the Scapy
tool (see Figure 4.6 - green flows), reproducing the normal operation of the simulated grid
and providing nominal status data back to the HMI 1, while directly manipulating the PLCs,
without any visible supervisory feedback. MITM attacks can leverage several techniques
from ARP poisoning to routing redirection.
The ARP-poisoning based MITM attack was chosen as the validation use case for this
attack category, as it exercises both protocol and process-level cyber detection capabilities.
In the ARP MITM, an attacker generates unrequested ARP replies for both the HMI and
the PLC, poisoning the local ARP caches in such a way that the attacker host places itself
in the middle of the communications path. For the PLC, the MAC address of the attacker
system becomes associated with the IP of the HMI, and for the HMI, the MAC of attacker
associates with the IP of the PLC. In this way, the attacker places itself in the middle of the
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communications path. In the first stage of an ARP poisoning MITM, the attacker generates
a series of unrequested ARP replies for both the HMI and the PLC (top half), poisoning
the local ARP caches in such a way that the MAC address of the attacker system becomes
associated with the IP of the HMI for the PLC and the IP of the PLC for the HMI, respectively.
Further interaction attempts from the HMI to the PLC will be redirected to the attacker system,
and vice-versa.
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Fig. 4.6 ARP-based, Man-in-the-Middle attack
The IT-OCSVM, performs well in terms of detection accuracy and false positive rate as
shown in Table 4.5.
Impact of the Fusion Mechanism
The fusion of the alarms produced by the individual OCSVMs consists of two stages. The
first is aggregation of alarms per source and the second is the clustering of them using a two
stage K-means clustering algorithm. The outcome of the fusion procedure is the deduction of
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Table 4.5 Performance evaluation of the IT-OCSVM module
Dataset DA FAR
A 98.81% 1.18%
B 94.6% 3.25%
C 95.20% 1.51%
D 96.37% 2.3%
All 96.3% 2.5%
the communicated alarms in the system and also their classification as: possible, medium and
severe. In Table 4.6 the number of initial and final aggregated alarms is presented. It can be
observed that the number of final alarms is significantly lower compared to the initial ones,
thus reducing the communication costs that such a distributed mechanism has in the network.
Table 4.6 Aggregated alarms produced by IT-OCSVM are significantly decreased compared
to the initial ones
Dataset Initial alarms Aggregated alarms
A 129 16
B 658 21
C 9273 18
D 203 16
All 10507 22
The IT-OCSVM system categorizes alarms according to the level of severity they have,
with most being classified as possible and those few originating from real attacks in the
system are termed severe (see Figure 4.7). Since the proposed mechanism is part of a
distributed PIDS, the information sent by the IT-OCSVM can be combined with those sent
by the other detection modules. For this reason this categorization of the alarms is important,
if correct final decisions about the situation in the network are to be taken.
Computational Cost and Time Overhead
The complexity of an IDS can be attributed to hardware, software and operational factors. For
simplicity, it is usually estimated as the computing time required to perform classification of
the dataset and output the final alarms. Increasing the number of classifiers usually increases
the computational cost and decreases their comprehensibility. For this reason, special care
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must be taken when choosing parameter Ppackets. This parameter determines the number
of created split datasets and thus, split OCSVMs. While the increase in number of split
OCSVMs does not impose any significant increase in the method’s performance, this may
slow down the detection mechanism.
In figure 4.8, we illustrate the time performance of the method compared to a simple
OCSVM. The evaluation was conducted on a PC with Intel core 2 duo 1.7 Mhz CPU, 2GB
main memory, 80GB hard disk 7200 rpm hard disk and Microsoft Windows 7 64bit.
According to Figure 4.8, the execution time of the proposed IT-OCSVM is bigger
compared to a simple OCSVM method. However, for the extreme configuration where 15
OCSVMs are created the performance gap increases and the proposed IT-OCSVM is 75 %
slower than the simple OCSVM, whereas when the IT-OCSVM operates under the default
configuration (5-6 OCSVMs) the performance gap is 55 %. Based on these observations
we conclude that the system, under the default configuration, performs a classification in a
comparable time to that of a simple OCSVM classifier and thus, it can be adopted in soft
real-time applications.
We have to mention that the performance evaluation conducted in this subsection, does
not include the time that each detection mechanism needs in order to create and disseminate
IDMEF messages or the computational and time costs that the correlator needs in order to
collect and analyze the alarms. It is evident that the OCSVM classifier, compared to the
proposed IT-OCSVM, needs significant additional time in order to send all the detected
alarms. Moreover, the categorization that is performed by the IT-OCSVM mechanism reduces
the computational load of the correlator that collects the alarms from the distributed detection
agents.
4.3.2 Hybrid Testbed Scenario
After the PIDS system was successfully installed, verified and validated the next step was
the evaluation of the validation results and recommendations for the next steps. During the
CockpitCI project evaluation, the conclusions of the different scenarios were provided, and
the results of the cyber-attack scenarios were analysed. The analysis included the results of
scenarios implementated for all the levels of ICS described in this document as also, was all
the equipment used in the CockpitCI Validation system.
Use Case: Network FIN SCAN
Similar to the procedure described earlier for the small testbed scenario, a FIN scan attack
was initiated using the nmap tool. This attack produced a network trace, a snapshot of which
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is shown in Figure 4.9. The OCSVM managed to identify this attack and create alarms,
creating IDMEF files, as shown in Figure 4.10.
Use Case: Network SYN Flood
The SYN attack, illustrated in Figure 4.11 explores the nature of TCP connections, by
sending a series of SYN packets (signaling the intention to initiate a TCP connection) to the
PLC/RTU, to which it responds with a SYN-ACK that is never acknowledged (ACK) by the
sender.
The captured network flows for the attacks were reported from the OCSVM module with
the use of IDMEF flies.
Use Case: ARP Cache Overwrite Attack
Similar to the procedure described in the testbed scenario earlier, and ARP spoofing attack
the attacker manages to associate his MAC address with the IP of the HMI for the PLC and
the IP of the PLC for the HMI, respectively. This means that further interaction attempts
from the HMI to the PLC will be redirected to the attacker system, and vice-versa. Working
with network traces that are produced during the ARP spoofing attack the OCSVM module
managed to detect this attack and communicate to the PIDS through IDMEF files.
Other attacks that were conducted during the validation of the PIDS, such as honeypot
interaction, infrastructure attack and RAT installation, were detected from other detection
mechanisms like SNORT, shadow RTU, Software Checker component, etc. Due to the
high volume of packets that were captured during the validation of the PIDS, which were
unlabeled, metrics like accuracy and false positive rate were not calculated and only the
capability of the PIDS to report the attacks real time was validated.
4.4 Summary
In this chapter we presented firstly the evaluation of an intrusion detection module for SCADA
systems that is based on an OCSVM classifier and a recursive K-means clustering method.
The module is trained off-line by network traces, after the attributes are extracted from the
network dataset. The K-OCSVM method is based on a recursive K-means clustering and
reassures that small fluctuations on network traffic, which most of the times cause OCSVM to
trigger false alarms, are ignored by the proposed detection module. The added computational
time of the method compared to a simple OCSVM varies between 5% and 10%, which results
in a negligible time overhead. This overhead does not include the time that each detection
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mechanism needs in order to create and disseminate IDMEF messages. By adding the time
needed in order to create and send each IDMEF file to the IDS management system the
proposed K-OCSVM method prevails on the overall performance in terms of time efficiency.
Finally we investigated how the parameter kthres affects the performance of the method and
proposed a multi-stage K-OCSVM method for better accuracy.
This chapter also analyzed the IT-OCSVM mechanism and evaluated it against the
baseline method for different attack scenarios. The detection mechanism, which runs in a
distributed way, can be used in large SCADA networks with no additional modifications. The
combination of behavioral analysis with machine learning classification techniques, enhances
the performance of the detection mechanism and improves accuracy for all the simulation
scenarios investigated. Moreover, the aggregation procedure embedded in the proposed
mechanism decreases the overhead of the IT-OCSVM and makes it easily incorporable in
a soft real time system. That is, the method produces a small amount of final alerts and
manages to detect all the simulated attacks. The intrusion detection module is part of a
distributed IDS system.
The presented methods can be used in soft real time situations as components of a PIDS,
having good performance in terms of time overhead and accuracy. Especially IT-OCSVM
shows high accuracy for all the network based attacks that were launched both in the small
SCADA testbed and the in the HEDVa emulator. Other kind of attacks, like honeypot
interaction, infrastructure attack and RAT installation cannot be detected from the proposed
methods since they demand deep packet inspection.
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Fig. 4.7 IT-OCSVM categorizes aggregated alarms. The left diagram shows aggregated
alarms created by IT-OCSVM without the additional medium alarms and the right diagram
illustrates all the final alarms created by the IT-OCSVM
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Fig. 4.8 Approximate execution time for the entire testing dataset
Fig. 4.9 FIN scan network trace
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Fig. 4.10 IDMEF message from OCSVM
Fig. 4.11 SYN Flood attack

Chapter 5
Conclusions and Future work
5.1 Summary of the Contributions
This commentary addresses the issue of Intrusion Detection in SCADA systems. Two novel
IDS that are based on the OCSVM mechanism are presented. Issues such as accuracy, impact
of fusion methods, computational and time overhead have been addressed for different
datasets that come both from wireless networks and hybrid SCADA test-beds.
The initial method, namely K-OCSVM, can distinguish real from false alarms using
the OCSVM method with default values for parameters ν and σ combined with a recursive
K-means clustering method. The description of the method along with the evaluation of
its performance were presented in one journal article [3] and one conference paper [5].
The K-OCSVM is very different from all previous methods that required pre-selection of
parameters with the use of cross-validation or other methods that ensemble outcomes of
one class classifiers.The proposed method is tested against the basic OCSVM classifier
with different parameters, which attested the stability of the new structure. Due to high
requirements that were imposed from the CockpitCi project, both in terms of accuracy and
time overhead, a second method, namely IT-OCSVM was developed and validated.
The later method, entitled IT-OCSVM was presented in three journal articles [1, 2, 4].
The IT-OCSVM method is capable of performing outlier detection with high accuracy and
low overhead within a temporal window, adequate for the nature of SCADA systems. In
order to achieve these goals, the proposed method consists of several distinct stages that need
to be carried out, as shown in Chapter 2. The method was tested and validated as a part of
the CockpitCI 1 security detection framework for SCADA ICS.
11CockpitCI FP7 Project (FP7-SEC-2011-1 285647), http://cockpitci.eu
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5.1.1 K-OCSVM
We have presented an intrusion detection module for SCADA systems that is based in
OCSVM classifier and a recursive k-means clustering method. The module is trained off-line
by network traces, after the attributes are extracted from the network dataset. The intrusion
detection module is part of a distributed IDS system.
The method is tested on three different datasets. For the first testing scenario, traces of
a wireless network are used. This test shows that the method is stable and its performance
is not influenced by the selection of parameters ν and σ . For the second scenario, testing
of the proposed module is conducted with datasets that are sniffed off a testbed that mimics
a small-scale SCADA system under different attack scenarios. After the completion of the
test, not only the most important intrusions are detected and reported by K-OCSVM but
also the total overhead on the system is limited. Finally, extensive testing of the K-OCSVM
module with real datasets, extracted from a medium sized HTB SCADA system, shows that
the performance of the proposed K-OCSVM method remains very stable under different
configurations. After the execution of the K-OCSVM method, for all the simulated scenarios,
only severe alerts are communicated to the system by IDMEF files that contain information
about the source, destination, protocol and time of the intrusion.
The main feature of the K-OCSVM module is that it can perform anomaly detection in
a time-efficient way, with good accuracy and low overhead. Low overhead is an important
evaluation metric of a distributed detection module that is scattered in a real-time system,
since frequent communication of IDMEF files from detection agents degrade the performance
of the SCADA network. Recursive k-means clustering reassures that small fluctuations on
network traffic, which most of the times cause OCSVM to trigger false alarms, are ignored by
the proposed detection module. The added computational time of the method, compared to a
simple OCSVM, varies between 5% and 10% which results in a negligible time overhead.
This overhead does not include the time that each detection mechanism needs in order to
create and disseminate IDMEF messages. By adding the time needed in order to create and
send each IDMEF file to the IDS management system the proposed K-OCSVM method
prevails on the overall performance in terms of time efficiency.
5.1.2 IT-OCSVM
The novel IT-OCSVM method is capable of performing outlier detection with high accuracy
and low overhead within a temporal window, adequate for the nature of SCADA systems. In
order to achieve these goals, the proposed method consists of several distinct stages that need
to be carried out. The first, similar to any other SVM methods, consists of choosing the most
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appropriate features for the training of the OCSVM models and the pre-processing of raw
input data. In IT-OCSVM alongside the central OCSVM a cluster of split OCSVM models is
created. The proposed IT-OCSVM analysis mechanism runs in a distributed way and can
be used in any SCADA system after proper training. The performance of the mechanism is
enhanced by the combination of behavioral analysis with machine learning techniques and
can be easily incorporated into a soft real time detection system, due to its low overhead.
Moreover the IT-OCSVM method was tested on a hybrid testbed under attack, as part of a
cyber-security framework for SCADA ICS, that was deployed within the CockpitCI project
[23].
5.2 Future Work
5.2.1 Future Work, K-OCSVM
The work presented in this commentary can be extended in many ways. For the K-OCSVM
method the following extensions can take place.
The proposed K-OCSVM can significantly reduce the produced alarms from the OCSVM
module that is the heart of the detection mechanism. The profound advantages of low over-
head and low false alarm rate come with the cost of lower accuracy and higher computational
overhead. In this section we discuss some enhancements of the proposed method that can
improve its performance. The initial results presented in this section can be found in [67].
Parameter kthres
As stated is Chapter 3, K-OCSVM method is a recursive clustering of the alarms produced
by the OCSVM module. This recursive procedure is used in order to distinguish severe from
possible alarms and finally disseminate only those that represent an actual misbehavior of
the system. This way the OCSVM module is enhanced in both the decreased overhead that
induces to the system from the disseminated alarm files and in the decreased false alarm
rate that it has. The recursive method stops when either all initial alarms are put in the same
cluster or when the divided set is big enough compared to the initial one, according to the
threshold parameter kthres.
In the simulations presented in Chapter 3 the parameter is set to 2. When raising the
value of this parameter the produced final alarms of the proposed K-OCSVM method raises
(See Figure 5.1). This raise also leads to a raise in the false alarm rate. On the other hand the
accuracy of the method raises since less profound attacks are detected. By raising the value
of the parameter above one limit the method degrades to the initial OCSVM. The optimum
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value for parameter K-OCSVM varies according to the architecture of the network. For big,
dispersed networks, large values of the parameter would lead to the creation of too many
alarms from the module, while at the same time, in a medium sized network, very small
values of the parameter would lead to a dangerous decrease of the detection capabilities of
the module.
Fig. 5.1 Paramater kthres affects the performance of the K-OCSVM system (Testbed scenario
with default parameters σ and ν).
Except from the static configuration of the network, traffic conditions can also affect
the performance of the method. In real SCADA systems the network traffic varies between
daytime and night, weekdays and weekends. In order to cope with both static and dy-
namic features of the network an enhanced K-OCSVM method that dynamically adapts the
parameter kthres, similar to [98, 99] could be effective.
Multi Stage K-OCSVM
The proposed method uses only the values of the initial alarms in order to filter out those that
don’t represent an actual attack. That way attacks that cause significant variation in certain
features of the OCSVM module are detected, while at the same time other more insidious
5.2 Future Work 49
attacks are passing undetected. A multi-stage K-OCSVM, both the number of attacks that
share common characteristics, like origin, destination, port number etc., and the actual values
of the attacks can be developed in order to better detect different kinds of attacks.
Figure 5.2 represents a possible architecture of a two stage K-OCSVM module. The
number of the stages can be increased and the alarms produced by each stage can be further
aggregated. The fusion of the outputs of the different stages can be done using any of
the existing ensemble methods, i.e. majority voting, performance weighting, distribution
summation, order statistics etc.
Fig. 5.2 Architecture of a Multi-stage K-OCSVM
The proposed K-OCSVM may not be sufficient to build an effective IDS on its own but
is highly valuable when coupled with other methods, especially as an integrated part of a
larger framework.
Moreover, it is likely that while anomaly detection provides opportunity to detect un-
known attacks it will be necessary to combine them with signature and ruled based IDS
components to achieve the greatest accuracy.
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Table 5.1 Configurations of the Network
Data PLC Gr. 1 PLC Gr. 2 HMI 1 HMI 2
1 Active - Active -
2 Active - Active Active
3 Active Active Active -
4 Active Active Active Active
5 - Active Active Active
6 - Active Active -
5.2.2 Future Work, IT-OCSVM
We have established that, relative to IT systems, IC systems (most notably SCADA), have
both a greater need for security and a more difficult environment in which to provide it.
Support Vector Machines have been shown to be an effective tool for providing intrusion
detection, although they lack effectiveness in isolation and are far more powerful when used
in conjunction with other methods. None of the materials and research studied examines
the adaptability or susceptibility of the proposed IDS systems to changes in the monitored
architecture. This is almost certainly due to a large extent to the fact that SCADA systems
tend to be relatively static. While Cheung et al [100] argue that model based IDS are suited
to SCADA due to their traditionally more stable environment, this stability is decreasing as
SCADA systems evolve, undermining this argument.
Based on these findings we conducted a first set of simulation to research how the changes
in the network architecture affect the performance of an IDS that is based on the OCSVM
principle. The initial simulations showed that there is a weak overall correlation between
testing other sets and accuracy (see Figure 5.3). In order to perform the tests, six data
sets were provided using the HEDVa. These sets represent network traffic from a SCADA
network running in six different configurations. There are two groups of Programmable
Logic Controllers (PLCs) and two Human Machine Interface (HMI) devices which may be
active on the system. Table 5.1 shows the configuration of the network for each of the data
sets:
In order to cope with the drop of accuracy that the IDS demonstrates when the architecture
of the system changes, we propose an adaptive mechanism that can be used in any system. A
primitive description of this system can be found in [101]. The mechanism that is presented
in Figure 5.4 matches the current network traffic of the system to the traffic that the IDS
was trained with. Based on the fact that the matching takes additional computation time, the
proposed adaptive system imposes a delay on the performance of the IDS. The matching only
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Fig. 5.3 Mean accuracy
takes into account the different IPs that exist on the network traffic and chooses the OCSVM
that was trained to a similar network. This could be extended also to the overall traffic that
exists inside the system, based on the fact that the volume of traffic changes between morning
and evening and between working days and weekends; especially for a system that controls
critical infrastructures that are directly related to human activity, e.g. traffic controls, smart
grid etc.
In the core of our adaptive IDS we have included Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient
[102]. Spearman’s rank is a non-parametric measure of correlation widely used to describe
the relationship between two variables that is used to report the difference in ranking produced
by two methods. Based on this metric we can find the most suitable IDS for the current
architecture of the network with a notion of traffic in it, since the metric also ranks the sources
based on the total traffic they induce in the system. One important parameter of the proposed
Adaptive IDS is how frequent the comparison of the current traffic to the pool of the trained
IDS will be and also the number of trained IDSs that we have in order to better match the
current situation of the network.
In order to evaluate the efficiency of our proposed Adaptive IDS (A-IDS) we have
performed a number of initial tests using the datasets provided from HEDVa. We have tested
the proposed A-IDS using different parameters as shown in table 5.2. We investigate how the
number of different trained IDSs affect the performance of the system. In our experiments
we know the number of different architectures of the system while in a general situation,
an automatic method for finding the optimal set of trained IDSs would be needed. Also we
investigate how frequent the comparison of current traffic to the ones used for training must
52 Conclusions and Future work
Fig. 5.4 Adaptive IDS (A-IDS)
be, since a small time gap would not include the necessary network traffic sample in order to
choose the correct IDS; while on the other hand a big time gap would have, as a consequence,
the system to compare possible different architectures.
Table 5.2 Simulation Parameters
Parameters Range Default
Number of trained IDS 2 - 5 5
Time gap (min) 1 -10 5
Number of trained IDSs In order to test the efficiency of our proposed A-IDS we have
done the following arrangement. The system architecture is initially based on configuration
1 (see Table 5.1 and moves from one configuration to the other following this sequence:
Configuration 1, Configuration 2, Configuration 3, Configuration 5 and Configuration 6.
During the operation of the system both a static and the proposed dynamic A-IDS are used.
The static IDS is initially trained using Configuration 1 and the dynamic has 3 or 5 trained
IDSs, each one representing a different configuration. The system is constantly collecting the
network traffic and compares the traffic from the last 5 minutes to the one that was used to
train the pool of IDSs using Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient. The same experiment is
conducted with the system starting from configuration 2, 3, etc. in order to cover all possible
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situations. Figure 5.5 shows the aggregated accuracy of the static and the dynamic A-IDSs
with 2, 3, 4 and 5 different individual trained IDSs.
Fig. 5.5 Aggregated accuracy of static and the proposed A-IDS
It is obvious from Figure 5.5 that the A-IDS is more stable in terms of accuracy for all the
different simulations conducted and manages to have a stable behavior while the architecture
is constantly changing.
Time gap In this subsection we test how much the time gap affects the performance of
the proposed A-IDS. As shown in Figure 5.6 when selecting a very small time gap the system
is performing worse than the static IDS, due to the fact that most of the time the system
chooses a wrongly trained IDS to use. This is caused from the small number of collected
packets used for choosing the correct IDS. These small datasets do not represent the actual
situation inside the system, causing the A-IDS most of the times to choose wrongly. On the
other hand a too big time gap leads to the degradation of the A-IDS to the static one.
These initial tests show that the proposed A-IDS can cope with the architectural changes.
Further tests with different datasets and more analytical research of how the different pa-
rameters may affect the method are needed. Moreover, the need of new datasets is based on
the fact that the evaluation of IDSs using the existing benchmark data sets of KDD99 and
NSLKDD does not reflect satisfactory results, as stated in [103]. This is due to three major
issues, their lack of modern low footprint attack styles, their lack of modern normal traffic
scenarios, and a different distribution of training and testing sets. Recently a new dataset
containing malicious data was introduced and analyzed [103]. This data set has 9 types of
the modern attacks types and new patterns of normal traffic, and it contains 49 attributes that
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Fig. 5.6 Time Gap affects the performance of the A-IDS
comprise the flow based between hosts and the network packets inspection to discriminate
between the observations, either normal or abnormal.
5.3 Discussion
Many IDSs [104, 6] that use network-based auditing study network activity to determine
if a node is compromised. This audit can be general (e.g., traffic or frequency analysis)
or protocol-specific (e.g., deep packet inspection). The proposed detection mechanisms
were parts of a PIDS that was responsible for continuously assessing the electronic security
perimeter of the CI. Since only general auditing of network activity (e.g., traffic or frequency
analysis) is not always efficient in detecting other attacks, like compromised HMI/PLC or
PLC reprogramming attack, other detection mechanisms like snort that perform protocol-
specific auditing (e.g., deep packet inspection) were used in parallel. Due to the fact that both
methods are based on the OCSVM module, they have the capability of detecting new types
of attacks. The key advantage of anomaly-based detection systems are the ability they have
to detect zero-day attacks [105]. Having to balance between high accuracy, low false alarm
rate, real time communication requirements and low overhead, a combination of several
techniques is needed.
The two methods can work on real-time situations without causing high overhead on
the medium. The candidate, having worked as a member of the working group that had a
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main objective for the adoption of Ethernet Powerlink Standards Group (EPSG) DS 301
– Ethernet Powerlink – Communications Profile Specification as an IEEE Standard, sees
that in cases where communication profiles like Ethernet POWERLINK are demanded,
the use of any PIDS must be designed in such a way that it can conform with the slot
communication management. POWERLINK manages the network traffic in a way that there
are dedicated time-slots for isochronous and asynchronous data. It takes care that always only
one networked device gains access to the network media. Thus transmission of isochronous
and asynchronous data shall not interfere and precise communication timing can be achieved.
The mechanism is called Slot Communication Network Management.
Further complication arises because it is known that a large percentage of attacks are
induced by inside attackers. Thus perimeter defense alone cannot defend the system. In such
cases, the question that one is confronted with is whether there is enough indication of an
ongoing attack in the dynamics of the system itself [106]. Despite this range of activities,
it has been proven that half of these have human error at their core [107]. Therefore, there
should be increased empirical and theoretical research in to human aspects of cyber security
based on the volumes of human error related incidents in order to establish ways in which
mainstream cyber security practice can benefit.
Security measures tend to neglect that persistent attackers will eventually gain access
whatever that perimeter protection may be. One main objective from modern security
solutions would be to develop novel methods that could detect and disturb the activities of
the attackers once they have gained access inside the system. Special care should be given to
the implementation of new strategies that can detect, prevent and mitigate data exfiltration
attacks, since intrusion detection/prevention strategies are now deemed to be inadequate for
data protection [108].
In order to strengthen the security of SCADA systems, one solution is to deliver defence in
depth [109] by layering security controls so as to reduce the risk to the assets being protected.
By applying multiple controls “on top of” the information asset (in this case the SCADA and
ICS configuration and management data) the architect introduces further barriers, which a
threat actor has to overcome. For the more competent threat actors this will slow them down.
Within the time it takes to get through some of the controls, the protective monitoring service
should have alerted someone to the attack, which will allow further action to be taken (such
as dropping the threat actors connection). Defence in depth ensures there is no single point of
failure from threats to assets by providing differing barriers (controls) in a layered approach.
By applying the industry standard 80/20 rule (80% effectiveness of a control) to each control,
it is possible to decrease the likelihood of a compromise exponentially as another control is
layered on.
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In order to be able to secure a system, analysts must take into account the interdepen-
dencies with other systems [110]. A system cannot be safeguarded correctly if treated in
isolation. In order to be able a system we must take into account several factors such as
security policy, technology, expert knowledge, system dependencies and human factor. The
problem of cross-border dependencies in Europe has quite a wide scope. Dependencies exist
across borders as regards to network and information security of different services but also
between different services across sectors and EU will take specific measures to deal with
such dependencies.
SCADA systems are controlling industrial control systems of energy, transport, manufac-
turing among others. Smart grids are deployed nowadays with main target the improvement
of power consumption and the optimization of costs. A smart grid cannot be widely de-
ployed without considering several security and privacy requirements, namely, authentication,
integrity, non-repudiation, access control, and privacy [111]. For this reason, recently, re-
searchers in the field of computer security have proposed several privacy-preserving schemes
for smart grid communications. Similar to interdependencies for security reasons, interde-
pendent privacy is an open issue for modern SCADA systems.
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A Cyber Security Detection Framework for
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Systems
Abstract—This paper presents a Distributed Intrusion Detec-
tion System (DIDS) for Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(SCADA) Industrial Control Systems (ICS) that was developed
for the CockpitCI project. Its architecture was designed to
address the specific characteristics and requirements for SCADA
cyber security that cannot be adequately fulfilled by techniques
from the Information Technology (IT) world, thus requiring a
domain-specific approach. DIDS components are described in
terms of their functionality, operation, integration and manage-
ment. Moreover, system evaluation and validation are undertaken
within a specially designed hybrid testbed emulating the SCADA
system for an electrical distribution grid.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber security is currently one of the main concerns for
SCADA ICS operators, as a result of a series of recent success-
ful cyber attacks against several targets, such as electric power
substations and distribution grids [1], sewage processing units
or even nuclear power plants [2]. These have had far reaching
impact, affecting a substantial number of persons, potentially
causing significant damage and ultimately threatening human
lives [3]. Post-event investigation has frequently linked these
attacks to the exploitation of vulnerabilities deeply rooted in
the ICS design philosophy and related technologies.
The first generations of SCADA systems relied on air
gapped isolation, together with a security-by-obscurity ap-
proach, based on proprietary or poorly documented technolo-
gies to protect the infrastructure. Later on, the introduction of
features from the information and communication technologies
(ICT) world, such as Ethernet networks and Transmission Con-
trol Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) stacks, encouraged the
interconnection of the ICS and ICT network domains, as well
as to the exterior (mostly for remote management) [4].
Increased connectivity, together with the adoption of open
and documented protocols exposed the SCADA ICS ”black
box” to a variety of new threats. Due to their importance,
those systems rapidly became popular targets for all sorts
of frivolous, ego-driven or vindictive attacks [5]. They have
even subject to Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) operating
over extended time periods as part of cyber warfare strategies
designed to probe and profile potential targets, with the aim of
extracting valuable intelligence data which can be later used
to attack civilian or military infrastructures. The Stuxnet [5]
worm is such an example, which has raised awareness for the
problems of Critical Infrastructure (CI) protection.
A. Motivation and Contributions
While empirical reasoning might suggest otherwise, the
two aforementioned domains are significantly different, mainly
due to the increasing number of ICT-related technologies
assimilated within ICS. ICS operation and design principles
follow an order of priorities which places availability and
reliability first, followed by information integrity and, finally,
confidentiality and security, while ICT follows the exact re-
verse order [6]. This is considered one of the primary reasons
behind SCADA infrastructure security issues, also explaining
the need for domain-specific cyber security mechanisms.
Recognizing the need to improve upon existing security
solutions for SCADA ICS, the CockpitCI1 project was set
up in order to address the problems of CI interdependence
and security in an integrated way. Its objectives included the
development and implementation of a cyber security detection
framework for SCADA ICS, which is the main subject of this
paper. This framework departs from the state-of-the-art in ICS
cyber security, by providing a series of benefits, namely:
• Diversified and innovative probing techniques, sup-
porting different types of security agents, tuned for each
specific ICS domain, together with the development of
innovative network, device and process-level security
probes, aimed at reinforcing the detection capabilities
beyond the existing solutions;
• Hybrid analysis capabilities, through integration of both
signature and anomaly-based techniques, providing the
ability to deal with both known and rogue threats;
• Integration, scalability and reliability, adopting a dis-
tributed multi-layered design, geared towards scalability
and reliability, using message queues to relay normalized
events between components.
This solution was also designed with existing infrastructures
in mind, by supporting mature technologies and taking advan-
tage of already deployed management and operations support
systems to provide topology and asset information.
This paper is organized as follows: the next section will
provide an overview of SCADA security, also addressing
proposals and initiatives to deal with existing issues. Section
3 presents the CockpitCI cyber detection architecture for
SCADA ICS, followed by Sections 4 and 5, detailing the
analysis mechanisms and detection agents within the platform,
respectively. Section 6 addresses the validation of the proposed
solution, the architecture of the testbed used for that purpose,
the test methodologies and results. Finally, Section 7 concludes
the paper, also presenting directions for future developments.
II. SCADA SECURITY: AN OVERVIEW
SCADA ICS security encompasses aspects as diverse as the
protection of physical infrastructures and processes, communi-
cations protocols, asset management or software and hardware
1CockpitCI FP7 Project (FP7-SEC-2011-1 285647), http://cockpitci.eu
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lifecycle management, which cannot be handled in the same
way as their ICT counterparts.
As an example, lifecycle management procedures that are
commonplace in the ICT world, such as patching and updating
a system, require a different approach for ICS. With avail-
ability being a top priority (components are frequently kept
in operation for years without re-initialization), the impedi-
ment/high cost of stopping production in case of (un)planned
downtime has prompted some ICS managers to neglect routine
updates or patching [7]. Moreover, since software releases
are subject to prior certification by equipment manufacturers
and solution providers, it might not be possible to deploy an
operating system patch or upgrade any other key component,
as it has not yet been tested for compliance. This is not even
an option for products beyond their support lifespan.
Another distinguishable issue has to do with the deployment
of security-related components. Due to the time-sensitive
nature of SCADA systems, several equipment and software
providers advise against installing anti-virus software in com-
puters hosting Human-Machine Interface (HMI) or server
hosts, due to latency concerns. Conventional IT Network
Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) face similar issues, being
considered unsuitable for inline deployment, as they constitute
an unwanted point-of-failure, which can also contribute to de-
teriorate communications latency (a critical aspect, especially
for systems dealing with strict, real-time, control).
Also, most mature SCADA protocols, that support the
communication between devices, such as Programmable Logic
Controllers (PLCs) or Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) and the
supervisory stations, are insecure. For instance, the Modbus
protocol, which was introduced by Modicon in 1979, is still
being widely used and supported for new product lines. Its
simplicity, which is one of the main reasons for its popularity,
also makes it insecure, as it does not support encryption or any
other protection mechanisms. Attempts to update this protocol
with encryption or authentication features were unsuccessful,
owning to increased hardware and computational overhead on
both the PLCs/RTUs [8] and master stations [9], while also
being incompatible with existing equipment.
These examples illustrate some of the reasons behind the
proliferation of unprotected, unpatched or unsupported sys-
tems within SCADA ICS, which are potentially vulnerable to
cyber threats. Together with the constraints on the implementa-
tion of counter-measures [10] this situation has made evident
the need for a domain-specific approach for ICS security, a
subject next discussed.
A. Towards cyber security awareness
At first, several SCADA operators tended to overlook
security issues, mainly because it was deemed too costly
and complex to update entire infrastructures, just to protect
them from seemingly far-fetched threats. This applied all the
more, when considering the potential implications of these
updates, such as going through planned downtime procedures
and further expenditure or abandoning proven and mature
platforms, valued for their reliability.
Once cyber security awareness started to grow among the
ICS community (a situation partly owing to the increase of
ICS-related security incidents), organizations in industry, re-
searchers and governments began working towards improving
security in SCADA systems. For example, the National Insti-
tute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has published a ref-
erence document [11] that provides an overview of ICS threats
and vulnerabilities, recommending adequate countermeasures
and policies. The Industry Standards Organization (ISA) also
published similar guidelines [6], as well as other organizations
such as the North American Energy Reliability Committee
(NERC) and the International Electrotechnical Commission
(IEC), which have published recommendations for infrastruc-
ture protection for electric production and distribution [12],
as well as the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Committee (USNRC)
regulations for nuclear infrastructures [13], just to mention a
few. ICS cyber security issues were also addressed as part
of wide scale-efforts developed within European FP7 projects
such as CRISALIS, PRECYSE and VIKING [10].
There has also been considerable amount of work regarding
SCADA intrusion and anomaly detection, including Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDS) [14], device-level anomaly detection
and classification [15], IDS solutions combining network
traces and physical process control data [16], detection based
on traffic and protocol models [17] and approaches based on
machine-learning techniques [18], among others. Acknowl-
edging the fact that each detection technique has its own
merits and scope, the CockpitCI architecture was built on
the idea that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts,
by bringing several of these techniques together within an
inclusive detection framework, which is described next.
III. THE COCKPITCI DISTRIBUTED IDS ARCHITECTURE
One of the primary goals of the CockpitCI project was
building effective cyber detection capabilities for SCADA ICS,
integrated within a Dynamic Perimeter Intrusion Detection
System (PIDS), which would be responsible for continuously
assessing the electronic security perimeter of the CI.
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Figure 1. High-level view of the CockpitCI PIDS architecture
The PIDS (see Figure 1) is organized along the distinct
network domains of the CI, each one with a well-defined
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security scope: Control, Process Control, and IT (information
technology). It is able to enforce security policies customized
to the particular characteristics of each domain, each having
its own analysis mechanisms, fed by several detection agents.
This architecture was designed to integrate different detection
strategies, namely:
• Detection agents, comprising specialized network probes
(such as NIDS), domain-specific honeypots [19] , host-
level agents (using HIDS–Host IDS and other agents) and
specialized device monitoring components;
• A distributed multi-zone, multi-level correlation struc-
ture, processing the event feed from the detection sen-
sor layer, complemented by machine-learning capabil-
ities, in the form of One-Class Support Vector Machine
(OCSVM) adaptive anomaly detection modules;
• Usage of topology and system-specific detection mech-
anisms, due to the fact that the role, placement and
behaviour of ICS components tend to remain unchanged
over larger time spans than their ICT counterparts. There-
fore, the analysis layer is also provided with information
from topology databases or asset management systems.
The PIDS operation is orchestrated and managed by means
of a Security Management Platform (SMP – see Figure 2),
which oversees the maintenance and management of detection
agents and analysis components (correlators, OCSVM analy-
sis), whilst also performing regular in-place security auditing
of the protected infrastructure. The SMP adjusts the detection
agent sensitivity threshold according to the overall risk level of
the infrastructure (adjusted to the estimated probability of an
attack event occurring) and also feeds other CockpitCI system
components with information from the detection layer, through
a secure mediation gateway.
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Figure 2. CockpitCI PIDS orchestration
Event messages exchanged between PIDS components are
encoded using the Intrusion Detection Message Exchange
Format (IDMEF - RFC4765)2, which establishes a neutral
format for intrusion detection related events. Also, the baseline
IDMEF schema is encoded using the Extensible Markup
Language (XML), allowing it to be updated or customized
without disrupting compatibility.
IDMEF event messages generated by detection agents
within each domain are published to a broker that routes
them to a message queue subscribed by a corresponding local
2H. Debar, D. Curry, and B. Feinstein. (2007) The intrusion detection
message exchange format
correlator. Once correlation is finished, each local correlator
publishes the results to a different queue subscribed by the
main correlator - the same queue is also fed by OCSVM
components. Finally, the events generated by the main cor-
relator are queued to be sent to the SMP. Each queue (an
”Event Bus”) is implemented using the Advanced Message
Queuing Protocol (AMQP), which defines a neutral (IDMEF-
compatible) message encoding method, whilst also providing
secure and reliable transport with high-availability features.
IV. ANALYSIS COMPONENTS
The PIDS analysis capabilities are provided by two types of
components: the correlators and OCSVM modules. Together,
they bring the benefits of both signature-based and anomaly
detection techniques within the cyber detection framework.
This section analyzes these mechanisms in detail.
A. IT-OCSVM
When designing an IDS for ICS, developers typically have
to face a difficult situation in that it is not easy to find
datasets that contain malicious traffic in order to train a typical
machine learning algorithm properly. On the other hand, the
datasets that can be collected from a real Industrial network
may contain traffic that is not legitimate, while the system is
agnostic of this In order to overcome these issues, the One-
Class SVM (OCSVM) has become a widely applied method
for outlier detection [20]. It can be trained with datasets that
contain only legitimate traffic. Once the model is properly
trained, it can detect any misbehavior of the system that is due
to possible attacks. The OCSVM classification technique can
detect novel attacks, as long as they produce network traffic,
and is capable of performing real time classification, due to
its low computational time.
The OCSVM method has some drawbacks though, like
production of high false positives, difficulty to cope with
different nature of attacks, induction of high overhead and
the inability to classify the attacks. All these issues reveal
the need for the creation of more sophisticated detection
methods [21] for SCADA systems. Based on these findings
we have developed and validated a new integrated detection
mechanism, namely the IT-OCSVM [18].
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Figure 3. Architecture of the IT-OCSVM detection mechanism
The novel IT-OCSVM method is capable of performing
outlier detection with high accuracy and low overhead within a
temporal window, adequate for the nature of SCADA systems.
In order to achieve these goals, the proposed method consists
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of several distinct stages that need to be carried out, as shown
in Figure 3. The first, similar to any other SVM methods,
consists of choosing the most appropriate features for the
training of the OCSVM models and the pre-processing of raw
input data. In IT-OCSVM alongside the central OCSVM a
cluster of split OCSVM models is created.
In the core of the novel IT-OCSVM mechanism lies the
OCSVM algorithm which is used in order to map the input
data, the network traffic, into a high dimensional feature
space (using a Kernel) and through iterations tries to find the
maximal margin hyperplane in order to separate the training
data from the origin in an optimum way. The OCSVM can
be viewed as a two class SVM where all the training data
lie on the one class and the origin is the only member of
the second class. The hyperplane that is created using the
following classification rule:
f(x) =< w, x > +b (1)
where w is the normal vector and b is a bias term. By solving
an optimization problem, OCSVM tries to find the rule f that
creates the maximal margin between the origin and the training
data. Using the same rule on real time test data x we can assign
a label f(x), which categorizes the data as anomaly when the
value of f(x) is negative. On the IT-OCSVM detection agent
several OCSVM algorithms run in parallel on separate training
datasets, labeling the data as normal or anomalous.
The next stage is the assembling of the information gathered
by the discrete OCSVMs. The outcomes of both the central
OCSVM and the split OCSVMs are combined by using a
simple mean value method. They are then given additional
weights through the use of Social Network Analysis (SNA)
metrics (Equation 2).
qe(i, j) =
N∑
n=1
widt(i, j) (2)
where, dt(i, j) is the outcome of each individual classifier n
for sample data i that originates from node j and wi is the
weight given to each classifier.
More specific, Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient is
used in order to add weight to alerts produced from different
sources based on the protocols that each source uses during
the training and the testing phase (Equation 3).
p = 1− 6
∑
d2i
n(n2 − 1) (3)
The new outcomes are further aggregated and classified into
categories, using a two-stage K-means clustering algorithm.
During the first stage of fusion individual alerts are grouped
together according to their origin. Each alert i has an initial
value qi (and a source j) based on the procedures described
above. Using the equations from (4), each aggregated alert j
is assigned two values qaj and qbj that represent its severity.
This severity comes from both the sum of the values of the
initial alerts and the number of attacks that originate from the
same node, thus indicating that this node probably misbehaves.
qaj =
∑
i
qs(i, j), qbj =
∑
i
1,∀ qs(i, j) with source j
(4)
During the second stage of fusion K-means clustering is
used in order to divide the alarms into: possible, medium and
severe (See Equations 5 and 6).
SSE =
K∑
k=1
Nk∑
j=1
||qaj − µk||2 (5)
where, Nk is the number of instances belonging to cluster
k and µk is the mean of cluster k, calculated as the mean of
all the instances belonging to the cluster i
µk,i =
1
Nk
Nk∑
q=1
qaq, j ∀j (6)
We use two k-means algorithms that run in parallel and
each alarm is assigned a final classification: possible, medium
or severe. These alarms are sent to the correlator using IDMEF
messages containing information such as the nature of the
alert, the location of the attacker in the system and the time of
detection. The proposed IT-OCSVM analysis mechanism runs
in a distributed way and can be used in any SCADA system
after proper training. The performance of the mechanism is
enhanced by the combination of SNA metrics with machine
learning techniques and can be easily incorporated into a soft
real time detection system, due to its low overhead.
B. Correlation
As shown in Figure 1, local correlators provide the first
event processing stage, being fed by the detection agents
deployed within their network domain and sending their output
to the main correlator in the form of IDMEF messages. Their
role is to filter, process and relate security events within
a network domain, also delivering noise filtering and event
reduction capabilities, aggregating alerts produced by several
detection agents or multiple events from a single source.
This approach provides context separation, whilst at the same
time allowing for increased scalability and efficiency, as the
main correlator can concentrate on multi-step, attack focus
recognition correlation, as well as alert prioritization.
The generic PIDS correlator architecture (see Figure 4)
encompasses two event interfaces: one to receive events (which
may arrive from detection agents, on local correlators or from
the local correlators, on the main correlator), and another
to send resulting events (to the main correlator, on local
correlators or to the SMP, on the main correlator), both using
an AMQP-based Event Bus.
The correlator components use the Esper Complex Event
Processing (CEP) tool, a flexible and mature event processor,
which exhibits a good equilibrium between CPU, memory
usage and execution speed in demanding situations. It natively
accepts XML-encoded events, which is convenient as IDMEF
is an XML-based format. Moreover, it is able to perform cor-
relation over sliding time windows using several data sources,
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Figure 4. CockpitCI generic correlator architecture
such as input events, persisted and cached information as well
as external data sources such as asset management platforms
and topology databases. Correlation rules are encoded using
Event Processing Language (EPL) statements.
The same architecture is used for both the local and main
correlators. Not only does this provide design uniformity, but
it also eases management and maintenance, as all correlators
share the same rule syntax, thus allowing for rules to be reused
across different contexts.
V. DETECTION AGENTS
Detection agents constitute the lowest layer of the PIDS
architecture, whose role is to collect evidence of suspicious
activity directly from the ICS infrastructure elements used for
security analysis. They gather information, normalizing and
feeding it to the local correlator for its network domain. The
PIDS includes a diversity of security probes and detection
agents, including (but not restricted to) the following:
• Network IDS: each network domain perimeter is mon-
itored using separate NIDS instances for IT, Process
Control, and Control Networks; feeding security events
to the respective zone correlator. Snort was used for this
purpose, but other NIDS can be integrated;
• Host IDS: Host IDS are deployed in the ICS sta-
tions/servers, providing host-level anomalous behaviour
detection. OSSEC was adopted for this purpose, although
different HIDS can also be used;
• Honeypots: these components act as decoys, to lure and
uncover attackers. The PIDS encompasses three types of
honeypots, one for each ICS network domain [22] ;
• Shadow Security Unit: a security and safety device that
is able to monitor a PLC or RTU continuously [23];
• Exec Checker: by passively intercepting network traffic,
the Exec Checker is able to capture and reassemble a
suspicious binary file, in order for it to be analyzed;
• Output Traffic Controls: this tool analyses network
usage profiles in order to detect the presence of Remote
Access Trojans, regularly scanning system components to
search for known toolbox signatures;
• Configuration Checker: this tool implements sys-
tem configuration monitoring, checking for unauthorized
modification or corruption of configuration data sources.
• Behavior checker: this tool monitors and analyzes the
behavior of low-level software and hardware indicators,
such as temperature and processor activity, in order to
avert or anticipate accidental or intentional disruption.
All detection agents publish IDMEF security events on the
Event Bus used by its local correlator and since each detection
tool has its own eventing format, a generic embedded adaptor
was developed to perform normalization. A uniform interface
provides agent management capabilities, via the SMP.
Among these detection agents, the Shadow Security Unit
and the SCADA Honeypot deserve particular attention, due to
their innovative nature. Both will be next analyzed in detail.
A. Shadow Security Unit
The Shadow Security Unit (SSU) [23] was developed to
address the protection of RTU and PLC devices within existing
SCADA systems. This was deemed a critical PIDS requisite,
due to reasons such as the need to deal with zero-day vul-
nerabilities or because mature device families with a poor
security record often have a large deployed base, the updating
or replacement of which is considered unfeasible.
The SSU (see Figure 5) is a device attached in parallel
to RTU/PLCs that is able to intercept and decode inflight
SCADA Protocol Data Units (PDU), correlating extracted data
with the state of the physical I/O channels interfacing with
field actuators and sensors. It is a security and safety probe,
providing continuous behavior and health device monitoring.
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Figure 5. The Shadow Security Unit
The SSU requires minimal modification of the existing
topology, being deployed out of the critical control path. This
reduces the possibility of interfering with the operation of
the protected device due to an eventual malfunction. Besides
behavior auditing, the SSU incorporates capabilities such
as command stream interception and processing, continuous
network flow monitoring and message integrity checks. An
optional Message Checker system (see Figure 5) can be used
to implement a closed loop between the SCADA stations and
the PLCs for communications integrity checking (for instance,
to ensure end-to-end SCADA PDU integrity).
B. SCADA Honeypot
One of the innovations of the CockpitCI PIDS is the
SCADA honeypot [22], conceived for deployment in the
process control network of a SCADA ICS, operating side-
by-side with the PLCs, RTUs and other devices, using the
network’s unallocated IP addresses.
6The SCADA honeypot constitutes a decoy for potential at-
tackers, attracting their attention and reporting any suspicious
interactions. This is achieved by emulating both the function-
ality and service set of a commercial PLC, with the purpose
of engaging the attacker in intensive probing activities, whose
traces can be used for profiling purposes. Its components
comprise a fully functional Modbus TCP emulator, including
register banks and functions, further complemented by other
protocol modules providing file transfer and management
services, which are commonplace in commercial PLCs, as well
as network portscan detection capabilities.
VI. DEPLOYMENT AND EVALUATION
This section details the PIDS validation process, comprising
the testbed architecture, IT-OCSVM performance, functional
validation use cases, and the event processing capacity tests
undertaken to estimate the scalability of the solution.
A. IT-OCSVM initial validation
In order to validate the performance of the IT-OCSVM
mechanism that is a core part of the PIDS, a small-scale
testbed was created, providing the means to mimic a SCADA
system operating both in normal conditions and under the
influence of cyberattacks. The testbed architecture was com-
prised by process control and control network elements, which
included a HMI station (for process monitoring), a managed
switch (with port monitoring capabilities for network traffic
capture), and two PLC units, for process control.
Tests evaluated the performance of the IT-OCSVM mech-
anism using three types of attacks (later described into more
detail in this chapter), namely: network scan, Man-in-the-
Middle (MITM) using ARP spoofing and Denial-of-Service
(DoS). In all three scenarios the IT-OCSVM module was fed
with network traffic and performed data analysis in order to
detect malicious behavior. The testing data consisted of normal
and attack data and the composition of the data sets is as
follows:
• Testing set-A’ : Normal data
• Testing set-B’ : ARP spoofing attack + Network scan
• Testing set-C’ : Flooding DoS attack + Network scan
• Testing set-D’ : MITM attack
The proposed IT-OCSVM detection mechanism exhibited
adequate performance in all attack scenarios, while managing
to achieve both high detection accuracy (DA) and low false
alarm rates (FAR), as shown on Table I.
Table I
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF THE IT-OCSVM MODULE
Dataset DA FAR
A 98.81% 1.18%
B 94.6% 3.25%
C 95.20% 1.51%
D 96.37% 2.3%
All 96.3% 2.5%
Based on the performance exhibited by the IT-OCSVM [24]
module, it was decided to deploy it along with the rest of the
PIDS components on the platform validation testbed, described
on the following subsection.
B. The HEDVa testbed
The Hybrid Environment for Development and Validation
(HEDVa) was designed by the Israeli Electric Company for
the development and validation of CIs as well as security
research projects, being used to implement the attack use
cases for the PIDS validation effort. Its architecture (see Fig-
ure 6) constitutes a hybrid approach, because of the existence
of real/physical SCADA and network/telecom infrastructure
components, which are used to implement a simulation model
of the electric grid elements.
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Figure 6. HEDVa networking architecture
The CockpitCI emulated HEDVa scenario corresponds to
an energy distribution grid, as shown in Figure 7. Its imple-
mentation required the development and testing of different
modeling techniques, also including related key performance
indicators, fine-tuned with data from production scenarios.
Grid elements such as breakers and feeders are controlled by
real PLCs in a simulation model, with voltage and current
values for segments being calculated accordingly using a
mathematical model of the physical grid. In case of failure,
the scenario is reconfigured accordingly with the operator’s
Fault Isolation and Service Restoration procedures.
C. Functional validation
This subsection presents the most relevant use cases for
PIDS validation, which were implemented on the HEDVa.
1) Layer 2/3/4 attacks: These scenarios correspond to
malicious activities targeting the SCADA network resources
associated to the data-link (2), network (3) and transport layers
(4) of the OSI model. For this category, two validation use
cases were chosen: a FIN/SYN Scan and a SYN Flooding.
A port scan is a typical first step for an attacker to obtain
information about the network’s hosts and its topology, using
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Figure 7. HEDVa grid scenario, with breakers and substation feeders
techniques such as SYN, ACK or FIN scans (among others).
This use case was validated on the HEDVa using the nmap
tool to send a series of SYN and FIN probes (see Figure 8) to
devices on a network scope, to scan for open TCP/IP ports.
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Figure 8. TCP FIN scan
The SYN flooding Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack abuses
TCP connections, by sending a high volume of SYN packets
to the PLC/RTU. This creates a large number of half-open
connections on the target device, leading to resource exhaus-
tion and the inability to answer new requests. For validation
purposes, SYN flood attacks were implemented using the
hping tool, against a PLC and an HMI, causing loss of process
visibility.
Functional validation demonstrated the effectiveness of sev-
eral PIDS components against both use cases:
• the NIDS and the OCSVM modules, which detect the
corresponding abnormal traffic patterns;
• the SSU authorized device validation and communica-
tions stream analysis modules, that detect the anomalous
traffic patterns, over a time window (see Figure 8);
• the SCADA Honeypot, which flags up abnormal interac-
tions.
Moreover, in the event that the FIN/SYN packets are forged
from a legitimate host, it becomes possible to detect the attack,
because of the SSU auto-similar flow pattern analysis features.
2) SCADA protocol and process-level attacks: SCADA
protocols can be specifically targeted by corruption, inter-
ception or tampering attacks. These can potentially lead to
a loss of confidentiality, visibility, or device connectivity,
also providing support to implement process-aware attacks,
thus compromising safety and security. A Man-in-the-Middle
(MITM) attack using Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) poi-
soning was chosen as the validation use case for this category,
exercising protocol and process-level detection capabilities.
The MITM use case starts with an intruder host within the
HEDVa Control Network sending unrequested ARP replies
to poison the targets’ ARP caches and hijack the Modbus
TCP protocol flows between the HMI 1 system and the PLCs;
this allows for the attacker to eavesdrop communications and
gather information about the SCADA network and the process.
Afterwards, the attacker will use the previously gathered
information to craft a scripted real-time simulator using the
Scapy tool (see Figure 9 - green flows), reproducing the normal
operation of the simulated grid and providing nominal status
data back to the HMI 1, while directly manipulating the PLCs,
without any visible supervisory feedback.
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Figure 9. ARP-based, Man-in-the-Middle attack against PLC+SSU
Because the HEDVa grid model depends on the coordinated
operation of all PLCs, the attacker scripts are able to respond
to HMI operations and react accordingly, simulating the cor-
rect reaction from the PLCs – as such, when the HMI operator
operates a specific breaker (managed by a PLC), the entire
view is updated with the correct energy values of affected
segments. This requires the attacker to properly handle all the
TCP and Modbus protocol semantics in real time, in order to
keep communication integrity and remain undisclosed.
Functional validation demonstrated the capability of several
PIDS components for detecting the MITM attack, namely:
• the NIDS, which detect network traffic coming from a
station not registered in the asset management or topology
databases, together with an anomalous ARP reply traffic
pattern (inter-arrival times below normal thresholds);
• the Control Network OCSVM module, that detects an
ARP packet rate above the classification threshold;
• the SCADA Honeypot, which detects unrequested ARP
replies on the Control Network domain;
• the SSU station validation and high-level command flow
processing modules, which detect Modbus command pat-
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terns deviating from normal sequences (modeled using
Markov chains), eventually involving unknown peers;
• the SSU message checker, that detects inconsistencies
between the HMI 1 interactions and Modbus commands
arriving at the PLC (see Figure 9).
3) Compromised HMI/PLC: This scenario corresponds to
a situation in which an HMI or a PLC becomes compromised.
For functional validation purposes, two cases were considered:
an HMI infected with malicious software and a PLC repro-
grammed by an attacker to disrupt a controlled process.
The HMI malware infection attack was performed using
the metasploit tool to inject a custom malware payload,
abusing an Operating System vulnerability allowing for remote
execution of binaries. This exploit was used to modify a series
of Basic Control Engine script files from the Cimplicity HMI
software to hide malicious activity, tampering with the events
used to update the HMI, while directly manipulating PLCs.
After the malware infection, the HIDS detected a change
on HMI file set signatures, together with an unknown process,
while the Exec Checker was able to detect the presence of
an executable payload in transit for HMI 1. This was further
confirmed by the presence of anomalous traffic patterns after
the malware infection, because of Command and Control
interaction (reported from the NIDS, OCSVM and output
traffic controls). Moreover, the behaviour analysis and com-
mand interception features of the SSU detected anomalous
command patterns, despite the fact that they were coming
from a legitimate source. The SMP security auditing module
could have prevented this attack, since it detected the exploited
vulnerability, which was left unpatched for test purposes.
The PLC reprogramming attack was implemented using
a vulnerability that allows for unauthorized upload and down-
load of ladder logic code on Schneider PLCs [25]. This was
used to reprogram one of the PLCs to flip the state of a breaker
at a rate fast enough to cause damage, while hiding its actions,
by providing nominal state information to the HMI.
While the abuse of function code 90 (0x5a) can be detected
on the NIDS (via signature rules or unauthorized flow de-
tection), there is a potential contention problem if the switch
monitor port where the NIDS is connected receives traffic from
other interfaces, all running at the same speed – this may cause
packet loss on the NIDS port. For this specific attack use case,
the SSU provides two effective mechanisms: command stream
interception (which captures the anomalous interaction) and
also behaviour checking, which compares the behaviour of the
PLC (command interactions and physical I/O ports) against a
model of its nominal operation mode, enabling it to detect an
anomalous switching rate on a physical I/O channel. Further
information about the performance of the PIDS can be found
on the public deliverables of the CockpitCI project 3 4.
3Deliverable 5.4 CockpitCI System Factory Trials Report,
https://www.cockpitci.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/CockpitCI-D5.4-
CockpitCI-System-Factory-Trials-Report.pdf
4Deliverable 6.1 – Validation Plan-Final , https://www.cockpitci.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/CockpitCI-D6.1-Validation-Plan-Final.pdf
D. Event processing capacity evaluation
To evaluate the capacity of the event transport and correlator
components, a series of off-band performance tests were
executed on a validation testbed (see Figure 10), composed of
three VMWare ESXi 5.5 virtual machines running the CentOS
6.4 Linux OS: an event publisher (simulating a PIDS agent),
an event processing node (with the RabbitMQ broker and the
PIDS correlator), and a consumer application for events.
Host 2
Correlator
Event 
broker
Host 3
Event 
consumer
Host 1
IDMEF 
event 
publisher
Queue A Queue B
Figure 10. Testbed for event processing capacity tests
The VM host is equipped with an Intel Xeon X5660 6-core
CPU running at 2.80GHz, and 32GB RAM. Core and resource
affinity parameters were tuned to avoid contention: VMs for
the event publisher and consumer used 1 core and 4GB RAM
each, while the event processing host was configured with 2
processor cores and 6GB RAM - all VMs have equal priority
I/O shares, for a non-SSD datastore. Network connectivity is
provided using a virtual switch running at host speed, reducing
the physical network latency and speed overhead issues.
The event processing node consumes events from queue A
on the broker and then, after processing, publishes results
to queue B. The correlator was configured with 20 state-
ment/rules, for testing purposes - all received events trigger
a rule and there is no second order correlation. For timing
purposes, the publisher records a timestamp on the IDMEF
messages, enabling the consumer to assess processing delay
by calculating the delta relative to the reception time of the
corresponding resulting event. System clocks on all hosts are
synchronized using the Network Time Protocol (NTP) .
Validation results will be next presented, with a focus on
event processing performance and CPU/memory overhead.
1) Event processing performance: The event processing
capacity tests for the correlation component were executed
using IDMEF event sizes ranging from 1 (minimum size
payload, with mandatory attributes) to 20 KB (corresponding
to a complex meta-event with several references). Tests also
evaluate the overhead for the queue acknowledgment mode,
which can either be enabled, so that the publisher receives
confirmation that the message was received by the consumer
or persisted to disk by the broker, or in AutoAck mode, in
which case the broker issues an acknowledgment as soon it
receives a message. Encryption overhead was also measured.
Figure 11 shows average results for 15 test rounds (standard
deviation between 4 and 11%) of 10.000 event bursts, executed
with persistence support so that the broker saves messages
to mass storage when they cannot be consumed right away,
allowing reliable delivery, albeit with a performance penalty.
The results show the event processing rate to decrease with
the message size, as larger messages take longer to send and
marshall/unmarshall. Also, confirmation and encryption over-
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Figure 11. Event processing rate
head decrease along with the message size, with the former
having a bigger (albeit increasingly insignificant) impact, when
compared with the latter, especially for event sizes between 5
and 20KB. Results were considered adequate for PIDS usage.
2) CPU and memory overhead: CPU usage for Host 2 was
continuously monitored during the tests. For 1, 2 and 5KB
event bursts, the CPU capacity of the host was exhausted, a
situation that is mainly attributed to the correlator, which alone
takes an average 70% of total CPU time for each test case –
for 10KB and 20KB, total CPU usage averaged at 82 and
80% respectively. These results can be improved: a physical
networking infrastructure will have a mitigating effect on event
bursts; also, as correlation is CPU-bound, a more capable VM
hardware configuration will have a significant impact. Memory
usage was stable at 810MB of RAM, approximately, with the
correlator using an average 104MB RAM, with a maximum
of 141MB - the rest was used by the RabbitMQ broker.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper presented the architecture of the CockpitCI
domain-specific IDS for SCADA ICS. Its design departs from
the state-of-the-art in CI security, incorporating distributed
multi-level correlation, together with domain-specific anomaly
detection elements, leveraging the benefits of both signature-
based and rogue threat detection. Also, the PIDS brings
together a set of heterogeneous detection and analysis compo-
nents within a common framework with normalized eventing,
coordination and orchestration capabilities.
Future developments of the PIDS are focused on the evolu-
tion of the Honeypot and Shadow Security Units, as well as
support for a more diversified set of SCADA technologies and
protocols. Research into complementary analysis techniques is
also undergoing, in order to improve detection capabilities.
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A B S T R A C T
Modern Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems used by the electric utility
industry to monitor and control electric power generation, transmission and distribution
are recognized today as critical components of the electric power delivery infrastructure.
SCADA systems are large, complex and incorporate increasing numbers of widely distrib-
uted components. The presence of a real time intrusion detection mechanism, which can
cope with different types of attacks, is of great importance in order to defend a system against
cyber attacks. This defense mechanism must be distributed, cheap and above all accurate,
since false positive alarms or mistakes regarding the origin of the intrusion mean severe
costs for the system. Recently an integrated detection mechanism, namely IT-OCSVM, was
proposed, which is distributed in a SCADA network as a part of a distributed intrusion de-
tection system (DIDS), providing accurate data about the origin and the time of an intrusion.
In this paper we also analyze the architecture of the integrated detection mechanism and
we perform extensive simulations based on real cyber attacks in a small SCADA testbed in
order to evaluate the performance of the proposed mechanism.
© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Cyber-physical systems are becoming vital for modernizing na-
tional critical infrastructure systems. Cyber attacks often target
valuable infrastructure assets, taking advantage of architectural/
technical vulnerabilities or even weaknesses in defense systems.
Most weaknesses in critical infrastructures (CIs) arise from the
fact that many adopt off-the-shelf technologies from the IT
world, without a significant change in terms of the operator
mindset, thus remaining based on the “airgap” security prin-
ciple that falsely assumes that an apparently isolated and
obscure system is implicitly secure. Consequently, once a system
is open to receiving off-the-shelf solutions, this increases its
exposure to cyber-attacks.
The proliferation of new technologies, especially Internet-
like communication networks,may introduce some new threats
to the security of a smart grid. In such a network there are three
crucial aspects of security that may be threatened due to the
CIA-triad, these being confidentiality, integrity, and availabil-
ity (Bennett and Highfill, 2008). Confidentiality is the property
that information is not made available or disclosed to
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unauthorized individuals, entities or processes. An attack on
this occurs when an unauthorized person, entity or process
enters the system and accesses the information. Integrity refers
to safeguarding the accuracy and completeness of assets, which
ensures that the information in the system will not be modi-
fied by attacks. Availability pertains to the property of being
accessible and usable upon demand by an authorized entity.
The resources need to be kept accessible at all times to au-
thorized entities or processes.
Beyond cyber threats like malware, spyware, and com-
puter viruses that currently threaten the security of computer
communication networks, the introduction of new and dis-
tributed technologies, such as smart meters, sensors, and other
sub-networks, can bring new vulnerabilities to a smart grid
(McDaniel and McLaughlin, 2009). In the three main control
systems of a CI, the SCADA is the central nerve system that
constantly gathers the latest status from remote units.The com-
munication system for wide-area protection and control of a
power grid can be blocked or cut off due to component
failures or communication delays. If one of the crucial com-
munication channels fails to connect in the operational
environment, inability to control or operate important facili-
ties may occur with the possibility of power outages. In this
situation, the effect of some widely known attacks can have
devastating consequences on SCADA systems. Moreover, the
design of the SCADA systems is different from conventional
IT networks, even when based on the same physical technol-
ogy, such as Ethernet networks. That is, industrial control-
specific protocols are used in SCADA systems, where a limited
number packet types are exchanged between entities of the
network.
Intrusion detection systems (IDS) can be classified into cen-
tralized intrusion detection systems (CIDS) and distributed
intrusion detection systems (DIDS) by the way in which their
components are distributed (Balasubramaniyan et al., 1998).
A CIDS is such that the analysis of the data will be per-
formed in some fixed locations without considering the number
of hosts being monitored (Kumar, 1995), while a DIDS is com-
posed of several IDS over large networks whose data analysis
is performed in a number of locations proportional to the
number of hosts. As one part of an intrusion detection system,
the DIDS has specific advantages over the CIDS. For instance,
it is highly scalable and can provide gradual degradation of
service, easy extensibility and scalability (Crosbie and Spafford,
1995). It is evident that the development of distributed IDS spe-
cifically designed for SCADA systems, being able to ensure an
adequate balance between high accuracy, low false alarm rate
and reduced network traffic overhead, is needed.The above dis-
cussion clearly indicates that specific intrusion detection
systems that reassure both high accuracy, low rate of false
alarms and decreased overhead on the network traffic need
to be designed for SCADA systems.
1.1. Motivation
Among other approaches, neural networks, support vector ma-
chines, K-nearest neighbor (KNN) and the hiddenMarkovmodel
can be used for intrusion detection.While existing signature-
based network IDS, such as Snort or Suricata, can be effective
in SCADA environments, they require specific customization
for such a purpose. Also, they are not effective against rogue
threats for which known patterns or signatures are not known.
OCSVM principles have shown great potential in the area of
anomaly detection (Maglaras and Jiang, 2014; Wang et al., 2004),
being a natural extension of the support vector algorithm in
the case of unlabeled data, especially for the detection of
outliers.
Social network analysis (SNA) can be used in order to dis-
cover security policy breaches in a network and refers to the
use of network theory to analyze social networks. That is, it
views social relationships in terms of network theory, consist-
ing of nodes, representing individual actors within the network,
and ties which represent relationships between the individu-
als, such as friendships, kinships, organizations and sexual
relationships. By using comparative metrics of network’s struc-
ture during normal and abnormal operation, we can discover
security policy breaches in a network. One can assume that
network communication between nodes constitutes a social
network of users and their applications, so the appropriate
methods of social network formal analysis can be applied
(Kołaczek and Prusiewicz, 2011). In on-line social systems per-
petrators of malicious behavior often display patterns of
interaction that are quite different from regular users, which
can be identified through the application of anomaly detec-
tion techniques.Thus, in accordance with García-Teodoro et al.
(2009) and Gogoi et al. (2011), network anomalies can be defined
as patterns of interaction that significantly differ from the
norm and in order to capture the appropriate patterns of in-
teraction, specific aspects of entities’ behavior are used (e.g.
email analysis). Similar to this, in a SCADA system, indi-
vidual entities demonstrate a quite different communication
behavior when infected, in terms of mean packet generation
frequency (traffic burst), protocol distribution or interaction
pattern.
Discovering anomalies in the context of a network system
is a challenging issue due to the complexity of the environ-
ment and the different nature of the induced attacks. Regarding
node behavior related decisions, it makes sense to ask more
than one decisionmechanism since this practice assures amore
trusted final decision. Ensemble systems of classifiers are widely
used for intrusion detection in networks (Curiac and Volosencu,
2012; Shieh and Kamm, 2009). These aim to include mutually
complementary individual classifiers, which are character-
ized by high diversity in terms of classifier structure (Tsoumakas
et al., 2004), internal parameters (Kim and Kang, 2010) or clas-
sifier inputs (Krawczyk and Woz´niak, 2014).
In real time systems, in addition to fast response and ac-
curacy, limited communication between detection modules is
also desirable. By sending an explicit message for every anomaly
detected, the intrusion detection mechanism will flood the
medium with messages that will cause a delay in the com-
munication between entities in the SCADA system. Moreover,
since the detection mechanism needs to be sited at several lo-
cations in the SCADA system in order to recognize the intrusion
near the origin, the communication overhead caused by the
detection mechanism is further increased. One solution is the
addition of a control channel, whereby these messages can be
communicated without affecting the system’s performance,
but this is not always feasible. For this reason, an aggrega-
tion mechanism that groups initial alerts and sends a limited
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number of messages reporting the fault/intrusion accurately
and on time is needed.
1.2. Contributions
The present article analyzes and evaluates the performance
of a recently proposed intrusion detection mechanism, namely
the IT-OCSVM (Maglaras et al., 2014), against the baseline OCSVM
method. The mechanism uses a central OCSVM and a cluster
of automatically produced ones, one for each source that
induces significant traffic in the system, an embedded en-
semble mechanism, social metrics, an aggregation method and
a k-means clustering procedure that categorizes aggregated
alerts. The mechanism runs in a distributed way and pro-
duces dedicated IDMEF (Intrusion Detection Message Exchange
Format) messages that report the severity of the attack de-
tected.The proposedmechanism is incorporated in a distributed
IDS (intrusion detection system) communicating with other de-
tection and management components of the system. IT-
OCSVM is evaluated using datasets extracted from a testbed
that mimics a small scale SCADA system under normal and
malicious operation. The evaluation of the proposed method
attests the superiority of the new structure in terms of accu-
racy, false alarm rate and system overhead.The article makes
the following contributions:
• Analyzes the architecture of the IT-OCSVMmechanism that
was initially presented in Maglaras et al. (2014).
• Describes in depth the different components that com-
prise the IT-OCSVM mechanism.
• Describes how distributed agents that run the IT-OCSVM
mechanism be integrated in a Perimeter Intrusion Detec-
tion System (PIDS).
• Evaluates the performance of the IT-OCSVM mechanism
through extensive simulations using datasets that are ex-
tracted from a testbed that mimics a small-scale SCADA
system in terms of accuracy and communication overhead.
• Evaluates the computational cost and time overhead of the
IT-OCSVM mechanism.
The rest of this article is organized as follows: Section 2 pres-
ents the use of OCSVM in SCADA systems; Section 3 describes
the IT-OCSVM mechanism; Section 4 presents the simulation
environment and results; and Section 5 concludes the article.
2. OCSVM for intrusion detection in
SCADA systems
SCADA systems (Fig. 1) that tie together decentralized facili-
ties, such as power, oil and gas pipelines, as well as water
distribution and wastewater collection systems, were de-
signed to be open, robust, and easily operated and repaired,
but not necessarily secure. Cyber-attacks against these systems
are considered extremely dangerous for CI operation and must
be addressed in a specific way (Zhu et al., 2011).
The one-class classification problem is a special case of the
conventional two-class classification problem, where only data
from one specific class are available and well represented.This
Fig. 1 – A typical SCADA system.
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class is called the target class. Another class, which is called
the outlier class, can be sampled very sparsely, or not even at
all. This smaller class contains data that appear when the op-
eration of the system varies from normal due to a possible
attack. The one class Support Vector Machine (OCSVM) (Jiang
and Yasakethu, 2013) possesses several advantages for pro-
cessing SCADA environment data and automates SCADA
performance monitoring, which can be highlighted as:
• In the case of SCADA performance monitoring, which pat-
terns in the data are normal or abnormal may not be obvious
to operators. Since OCSVM does not require any signa-
tures of data to build the detection model, it is well suited
for intrusion detection in SCADA environments.
• Since the detection mechanism does not require any prior
information of the expected attack types, OCSVM is capable
of detecting both known and unknown (novel) attacks.
• In practice, training data taken from SCADA environment
could include noise Samples and most of the classifica-
tion based intrusion detection methods are very sensitive
to noise. However, the OCSVM detection approach is robust
to noise samples in the training process.
• Algorithm configuration can be controlled by the user to
regulate the percentage of anomalies expected.
• Due to the low computation time, OCSVM detectors can
operate fast enough for online SCADA performance
monitoring.
• Typical monitoring of data of SCADA systems consists of
several attributes and OCSVM is capable of handling mul-
tiple attributed data.
3. IT-OCSVM detection mechanism
The main purpose of the IT-OCSVM detection mechanism is
to perform anomaly detection in a time-efficient way, with good
accuracy and low overhead, within a temporal window ad-
equate for the nature of SCADA systems. In order to achieve
the aforementioned goals several operation stages need to be
carried out.
• Pre-processing of raw input data in order to feed the IT-
OCSVMmodule.The attributes in the raw data of the testbed
contain all forms: continuous, discrete, and symbolic, with
significantly varying resolution and ranges. Most pattern
classification methods are not able to process data in such
a format. Hence, pre-processing is required before pattern
classification models can be built.This consists of two steps:
the first involves mapping symbolic-valued attributes to
numeric-valued attributes and the second is implemented
scaling. Different pre-processing techniques are used based
on the characteristics of each feature type (Lazarevic et al.,
2003).
• Selection of the most appropriate features for the training
of the IT-OCSVM model. These features are divided into
content and time based features. Since the majority of DoS
and probing attacks may use hundreds of packets, time-
based features are mostly used.
• Creation of cluster of OCSVM models that are trained on
discrete sources.There are many slow probing attacks that
scan the hosts using much larger intervals, thus being able
to merge into the overall traffic in the network. As a con-
sequence, these attacks cannot be detected using derived
time based features and in order to capture them, the raw
data after arriving in the module are split into different
datasets according to the sender of the packet. An OCSM
module is created and trained for each split dataset. The
cluster of split OCSVMs runs in parallel with the central
OCSVM and produces errors targeted to the specific source.
It is important to mention that a split OCSVM is not created
for each source, but only for those sources that produce high
traffic in the network during the training period. In order to
separate significant nodes, a threshold Ppackets is used and every
source that produces a number of packets over this thresh-
old during the training period is marked as a significant node.
If during the testing period a source is showing big activity,
while not being marked as significant, a medium alarm is fired
for it.
• Testing of the traffic dataset that contains malicious attacks.
Based on the models created from the training phase, the
new dataset is tested against normal patterns. Each OCSVM
module returns a function f that takes the value +1 in a
region capturing normal data points (i.e. for events imply-
ing normal behavior of the SCADA system) and takes a
negative value elsewhere (i.e. for events implying abnor-
mal behavior of the SCADA system).
• Ensemble of classifiers. The initial outcomes of the differ-
ent OCSVM modules are combined by the ensemble based
mechanism that uses mean majority voting.
• Social analysis. Social network analysis is executed based
on the network traces and Spearman’s rank correlation co-
efficient is used in order to add weight to alerts produced
from different sources.
• Fusion of the information. Due to the possible existence of
multiple anomalies in a SCADA system, the outcomes of the
different models are gathered and classified in terms of im-
portance. This importance is derived through aggregation
and k-means clustering of the outputs.
• Communication of the mechanism. In order to cooperate
with other components of the IDS, the mechanism sends
IDMEF files.The created files describe the nature of the alert
in terms of importance, the position in the system, time,
etc.
3.1. Attribute extraction
Feature extraction is essential in a classification problem. At-
tributes in the network trace datasets have all forms:
continuous, discrete, and symbolic, with significantly varying
resolution and ranges. Most pattern classification methods are
not able to process data in such a format. Hence pre-processing
is required before pattern classification models could be built.
Pre-processing consists of two steps: The first step involved
mapping symbolic-valued attributes to numeric valued attri-
butes and the second step implemented scaling. The main
advantage of scaling is to avoid attributes in greater numeric
ranges dominating those in smaller numeric ranges. Another
advantage is to avoid numerical difficulties during the
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calculation. Based on a previous analysis of data we selected
some initial features that are used as attributes for our OCSVM
model.
3.1.1. Central OCSVM
The features and their corresponding network data features
are shown in Table 1. Some features of the data are derived
features, which are useful in distinguishing normal connec-
tion from attacks.These features are either nominal or numeric.
The smooth packet growth over time represents a normal be-
havior of the system when no malicious data are detected and
the slope of the line can vary from time to time, depending
on the load of the system. When malicious data are broad-
casted over the network, the accumulative packet size may rise,
but since in many situations intruders send 0 length packet
sizes (ack/nack packets), this feature by itself is not enough to
detect these situations. A burst in traffic injected in the system
is another characteristic of an intrusion. Infected nodes may
broadcast messages flooding the system with messages that
are of no use and block the normal operation of the network.
Thus, the first two attributes that we used for this initial
training/testing phase were rate and packet size. The values
were scaled to the range [0, 1].
The rate (1st attribute) was calculated using Eq. (1):
Rate
Time difference
Max Time Differencescaled
= (1)
Time difference is calculated by the difference of time of
current packet and the time of previous packet injected in the
system.
The packet size (2nd attribute) was scaled using Eq. (2):
Packetscaled
Packet Size
Max Packet Size
= (2)
Moreover, since majority of DoS and probing attacks may
use hundreds of packets, we have constructed time-based fea-
tures that attempt to capture the previous recent packets with
similar characteristics. Feature 3 examines only the packets
in the last 10 packets that have the same destination host as
the current packet (same host feature). Feature 4 examines only
the packets in the past 10 packets that have both same source
and destination as the current packet. For producing feature
5, each row of the dataset is assigned a value indicating the
number of ARP packets in the last 10 packets.
3.1.2. Cluster of split OCSVMs
There are many slow probing attacks that scan the hosts using
much larger interval and merge in the overall traffic in the
network. As a consequence, these attacks cannot be detected
using derived time based features. In order to capture these
types of attacks, we modified the OCSVMmodule to automati-
cally create a cluster of split OCSVMs (see Fig. 2). The features
of the split OCSVMmodules are a subset of the central OCSVM
and include features 1, 2, and 5. Moreover, the split datasets,
each consisting of the packets send only by an individual source,
add to the detection mechanism the diversity that is crucial
in order to improve the overall eficiency (dataset splitting;
Krawczyk and Woz´niak, 2014).
3.2. Ensemble system
Ensemble methods can be differentiated according to the extent
each classifier affects the others. This property indicates
whether the classifiers are dependent or independent.The first
situation occurs when the outcomes of a certain classifier affect
the creation of the next (Menahem et al., 2013) and the latter,
when each classifier is built independently and their results
are combined in some fashion (Tax and Duin, 2001). Our pro-
posed mechanism uses an independent ensemble mechanism.
Apart from the central OCSVM, which is trained on the entire
dataset, a cluster of split OCSVMs is automatically created
through the decomposition of the traffic dataset into disjoint
subsets 2.The idea is based on the work of Chawla et al. (2004),
who achieved high accuracy by building thousands of classi-
fiers trained from small subsets of data in a distributed
environment and through this decomposition, high diversity
of the methods is achieved. Diversity is an essential feature
of an ensemble mechanism in order to achieve high accuracy
(Tumer and Ghosh, 1996).
Table 1 – Features of the central OCSVM model.
Network data feature Type of feature
Packet size Content based
Rate Time based
Nopackets–dst Time based
Nopackets–src–dst Time based
NoARP–packets Time based
Fig. 2 – Decomposition of the traffic dataset to disjoint subsets.
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A combination procedure is then applied so as to produce
a single classification for a given instance. There exist many
ensemble classification methods, e.g. majority voting, perfor-
mance weighting, distribution summation and order statistics.
These methods have some advantages and disadvantages in
terms of accuracy and computational cost. In a real time system,
both parameters are crucial and for this reason a simple but
effective ensemble mechanismmust be chosen (Rokach, 2010).
In order to achieve a balance between these two parameters,
the outcomes of both the central and the split OCSVMs are com-
bined using a simple algebraic weighted sum rule using Eq.
(3). The ensemble based mechanism is represented in Fig. 3.
q i j wd i je i t
n
N
, ,( ) = ( )
=
∑
1
(3)
where dt(i, j) is the outcome of each individual classifier n for
sample data i that originates from node j and wi is the weight
given to each classifier.
The values that are produced from this stage are weighted
using the social analysis module, according to the Spear-
man’s rank coefficient for every significant source.These values
are then fed into the aggregation module.
3.3. Social analysis module
Deviation from the normal protocol operation in communi-
cation networks has received considerable attention from the
research community in recent years.A malicious node may use
the vulnerabilities of the system architecture to perform dif-
ferent kinds of attacks. Hence, for network reliability it is
necessary to develop an efficient technique to detect misbe-
having clients in a timely manner and the correlation
coefficients between entities can effectively detect malicious
nodes (Hamid et al., 2008).
In order to enhance the performance of the OCSVMmodule,
parallel statistical algorithms are executed. For each signifi-
cant source that is detected during training, a list of the
protocols used is created, which are ranked and stored along
with the IP/MAC addresses of each source. During the testing
phase the same procedure is executed, thus producing a list
of the protocols used for each significant source. The two lists
are compared using Spearman’s correlation coefficient
(Spearman, 1904).
p
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The final output is a number qj for each source j that indi-
cates whether there is a differentiation in the way that each
source behaves during the training and testing period. The
output of themethod is a value between 1 and 0,with a number
close to 1 indicating similar behavior of the source both in the
training and testing sessions.This value is used in order to give
additional significance to alerts produced from the specific
source from the OCSVMmodules (see Eq. 5). In Fig. 4 an example
of the protocols that are mainly used during normal and ab-
normal operation of a node is presented.
q i j
q i j
p
q i j with source node js
e
j
e,
,
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3.4. Fusion of alarms — final outputs
The OCSVM module produces one initial alarm for any devia-
tion in network traffic from normal, based on the training
models that it has created. In real time systems in addition
to fast response and accuracy, limited communication between
the detection modules is desirable. For this reason we imple-
ment a fusion procedure which groups alerts per source node
and gives final scores to aggregated alerts based on the initial
values and the number of similar initial alerts.
The first stage of fusion consists of an aggregation mecha-
nism that groups individual alerts according to their origin. Each
alert i has an initial value qi (and a source j) based on the pro-
cedures described in Sections 3.2 and 3.3. Using Eq. (6) each
aggregated alert j is assigned two values qaj and qbj that rep-
resent its severity. This severity comes from both the sum of
the values of the initial alerts and the number of attacks that
originate from the same node.
qa q i j qb q i j with source node jj s
i
j
i
s= ( ) = ∀ ( )∑ ∑, , , ,1 (6)
During the second stage of fusion the system uses K-means
clustering so as to divide the alarms into possible, medium and
severe. The k-means clustering algorithm is one of the sim-
plest and most commonly used clustering algorithms. It is a
partitional algorithm that heuristically attempts to minimize
the sum of squared errors.
Fig. 3 – Ensemble based system.
Fig. 4 – Most used protocols used by a node during normal
(left) and abnormal (right) operation.
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where Nk is the number of instances belonging to cluster k and
µk is the mean of cluster k, calculated as the mean of all the
instances belonging to cluster i,
μk i
k
q
q
N
N
qa j j
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=
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1
(8)
The algorithm begins with an initial set of cluster centers
and in each iteration each instance is assigned to its nearest
cluster center according to the Euclidean distance between the
two.We use two k-means algorithms that run in parallel which
partition alerts into two categories: possible and severe.These
decisions are then combined according to the above equa-
tions and are assigned their final classification: possible,
medium or severe, according to Fig. 5.
Using the fusion procedure, the final alarms that the system
produces are significantly decreased and all the sources with
suspect behavior are reported. The whole procedure is de-
scribed in Fig. 6.
In order to cooperate with the other modules, the IT-
OCSVM mechanism is integrated in the PID system and
communicates with the other modules created under the
“Cockpit CI project” using IDMEF (Debar et al., 2007) files. The
IDMEF defines the experimental standard for exchanging in-
trusion detection related events and a typical IDMEF file
produced by our system is shown in Fig. 7.The IDMEF message
contains information about the source of the intrusion, the time
of the intrusion detection, themodule that detected the problem
and a classification of the detected attack. Knowledge of the
source node where the intrusion originates is a very impor-
tant feature an IDS system must have. Once the infected node
is spotted, the infection can be limited by the isolation of this
node from the rest of the network. Fast and accurate detec-
tion of the source node of a contamination is crucial for the
correct function of an IDS.
3.5. Nature of the trial
The trial is conducted offline with the use of two datasets ex-
tracted from the testbed (Fig. 8).The testbed architecturemimics
a small-scale SCADA system, comprising the operations and
field networks, which include a Human–Machine Interface
Station (for process monitoring), a managed switch (with port
monitoring capabilities for network traffic capture), and two
Programmable Logic Controller Units, for process control. The
NIDS and IT-OCSVMmodules are co-located on the same host,
being able to intercept all the traffic flowing in the network.
Three kinds of attacks are evaluated:
• Network scan attack — In a typical network scan attack,
the attacker uses TCP/FIN scan to determine if ports are
Fig. 5 – K-means clustering module.
Fig. 6 – Architecture of detection mechanism.
Fig. 7 – Typical IDMEF message produced by the IT-OCSVM mechanism.
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closed to the target machine; closed ports answer with RST
packets while open ports discard the FIN message. FIN
packets blend with background noise on a link and are hard
to detect.
• ARP cache spoofing — MITM attack ARP cache spoofing is
a technique where an attacker sends fake ARP messages.
The aim is to associate the attacker’s MAC address with the
IP address of another host, thus causing any traffic meant
for that IP to be sent to the attacker instead. The attacker
could choose to inspect the packets, modify data before for-
warding (man-in-the-middle attack) or launch a denial of
service attack by causing some of the packets to be dropped.
• DoS attack — Network flood refers to the situation where
the attacker floods the connection with the PLC by sending
SYN packets.
4. Results and analysis
Each OCSVM that is trained produces a separate model file
which is used in order to classify new data as normal or ma-
licious. All OCSVMs use Gaussian RBF Kernel functions with
default parameters σ = 0.01 and ν = 0.001.The parameters used
during evaluation of the proposed IT-OCSVM detection method
are shown in Table 2.
During execution of the proposed detection mechanism, a
separate file that contains information about the split sources
is also created. This file is used in order to split the testing
dataset according to the sources that are categorized as im-
portant during training. A snapshot of the sources file is shown
in Fig. 9. For each row, the IP/MAC address of the source is fol-
lowed by the 5most used protocols during the training period,
which are sorted in descending order.These protocols are com-
pared with those used by the same source in the testing period
in order to calculate the Spearman’s correlation coefficient value
for each separate source.
4.1. Initial network traffic analysis
In Fig. 10 the rate of the injected packets in the system during
normal and abnormal operation of the SCADA system is moni-
tored. In the lower part of the figure, we can observe that when
the DOS attack takes place, the rate of the packets injected into
the system is much higher compared to a normal operation
period.
MITM and network scan attacks, on the other hand, do not
have such profound consequences on the traffic rate, since they
use fewmessages (MITM) or they merge with the overall traffic.
As can be observed from Fig. 11, an ARP spoofing attack can
be identified by using feature 5 in the overall dataset. Apart
from the actual attack, there are also other instances where
the central OCSVM would probably fire an alarm due to high
values of this feature.
When subsets are used, the occurrence of this attack is more
obvious. In Fig. 12 the values of feature 5 over time for two
sources that induce significant traffic in the system are shown.
The left diagram presents the number of ARP packets sent by
Fig. 8 – Architecture of the testbed.
Table 2 – Evaluation parameters.
Independent parameter Default value
ν 0.001
σ 0.01
Ppackets − (No of split OCSVMs)
1
100
5( )
Ensemble mechanism Weighted sum value
k-means 2 stages Fig. 9 – Sources file created by the OCSVM module.
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the intruder during the testing period, while the right pres-
ents the same distribution for a normal node of the system.
The difference in the performance of a node under attack is
more evident using the split datasets.
Moreover, the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient of the
source that executes a scan attack (Network scan or ARP scan)
is heavily affected since node behavior deviates from normal
in terms of protocol distribution, thus enhancing the detec-
tion capability of our mechanism.
4.2. Method evaluation
This subsection describes the performance of the proposed
OCSVM based intrusion detection algorithm for the simu-
lated data. During the testing period, several attack scenarios
are simulated in the testbed, which include a network scan,
a network flood and an MITM attack. Since the attacks are per-
formed during different time periods, we divide the testing
dataset into several smaller ones, each containing a different
Fig. 10 – Rate of packets during normal and abnormal operation time.
Fig. 11 – ARP spoofing attack — overall dataset.
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attack.The testing data consist of normal and attack data and
the composition of the datasets is as follows:
• Testing set-A′: 1–5000: Normal data
• Testing set-B′: 5000–10,000: Normal data + Arp spoofing
attack + Network scan
• Testing set-C′: 10,000–25,000: Normal data + Flooding Dos
attack + Network scan
• Testing set-D′: 25,000–41,000: Normal data + MITM attack
The IT-OCSVM method, as shown in Maglaras et al. (2014),
performs well in terms of detection accuracy and false posi-
tive rate 3 (Table 3).
4.3. Ensemble mechanism. Parameter Ppackets
The ensemble module affects the performance of the IT-
OCSVM. Discrete OCVSMs that are created by the mechanism
have an impact on the accuracy of the detection mechanism.
Regarding which, the cluster of automatically produced OCSVMs
can be significantly large (one OCSVM per source) or very small
(a total of one or two OCSVMs) according to the value of the
parameter Ppackets. Fig. 13 shows the relation between the value
of the threshold parameter Ppackets and the number of created
OCSVMs as well as how this affects the performance of the
detection mechanism.
The parameter Ppackets is given a value as a proportion of the
number of rows of the entire training dataset. According to
Fig. 13, it is evident that an appropriate selection of param-
eter Ppackets is essential for the correct operation of the proposed
mechanism.When the parameter is given a very big value, then
the created OCSVMs are too few to improve accuracy and the
performance of the mechanism deteriorates.When this value
is extremely big
1
10
, then the mechanism degrades to a simple
OCSVMmodule. For values relatively low, the number of created
OCSVMs grows without an improvement in systems accu-
racy. As observed in Fig. 13, when the number of created
OCSVMs is relatively large, the accuracy of the mechanism
drops. As split training sets are created for sources with no sig-
nificant traffic in the training period, the OCSVMs that are
created are not correctly trained and instead of helping, they
harass the decision procedure. For values of the threshold pa-
rameter between
1
40
and
1
100
, the accuracy of the detection
mechanism is optimal. In fact, for these values, the accuracy
of the IT-OCSVM mechanism compared to the initial OCSVM
is 6% better. That is, the simple OCSVM achieves accuracy of
90.7%, while the proposed IT-OCSVM reaches 96.4% (Fig. 13).
Apart from the profound improvement in terms of accuracy,
the proposed mechanism has other advantages compared to
a simple OCSVM module. It creates a decreased number of
alarms and also categorizes these according to their severity,
as described in the next subsection.
4.4. Impact of the fusion mechanism
The fusion of the alarms produced by the individual
OCSVMs consists of two stages. The first is aggregation of
Fig. 12 – ARP spoofing attack — split datasets.
Table 3 – Performance evaluation of the IT-OCSVM
module.
Dataset DA FAR
A 98.81% 1.18%
B 94.6% 3.25%
C 95.20% 1.51%
D 96.37% 2.3%
All 96.3% 2.5%
Fig. 13 – Number of automatically created OCSVMs against
accuracy of the mechanism.
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alarms per source and the second is the clustering of them
using a two-stage k-means clustering algorithm, as de-
scribed in Section 3.4. The outcome of the fusion procedure
is the deduction of the communicated alarms in the system
and also their classification as possible, medium and severe.
In Table 4 the number of initial and final aggregated alarms
is presented. It can be observed that the number of final alarms
is significantly lower compared to the initial ones, thus
reducing the communication costs that such a distributed
mechanism have in the network.
The IT-OCSVM system categorizes alarms according to the
level of severity they have, with most being classified as pos-
sible and those few originating from real attacks in the system
are termed severe (see Fig. 14). Since the proposed mecha-
nism is part of a distributed PIDS, the information sent by the
IT-OCSVM can be combined with those sent by the other de-
tection modules. For this reason this categorization of the
alarms is important, if correct final decisions about the situ-
ation in the network are to be taken.
4.5. Computational cost and time overhead
The complexity of an IDS can be attributed to hardware, soft-
ware and operational factors. For simplicity, it is usually
estimated as the computing time required to perform classi-
fication of the dataset and output the final alarms. Increasing
the number of classifiers usually increases the computa-
tional cost and decreases their comprehensibility. For this
reason, special care must be taken when choosing parameter
Ppackets. As mentioned in Subsection 4.3, this parameter deter-
mines the number of created split datasets and thus split
OCSVMs.While the increase in number of split OCSVMs does
not impose any significant increase in the method’s perfor-
mance, this may slow down the detection mechanism.
In Fig. 15, we illustrate the time performance of the method
compared to a simple OCSVM.The evaluation was conducted
on a PC with Intel core 2 duo 1.7 MHz CPU, 2 GB main memory,
80 GB hard disk 7200 rpm hard disk and Microsoft windows 7
64 bit.
According to Fig. 15, the execution time of the proposed IT-
OCSVM is bigger compared to a simple OCSVM method.
However, or the extreme configuration where 15 OCSVMs are
created, the performance gap increases and the proposed IT-
OCSVM is 75% slower than the simple OCSVM, whereas when
the IT-OCSVM operates under the default configuration (5–6
OCSVMs), the performance gap is 55%. Based on these obser-
vations we conclude that the system, under the default
Table 4 – Aggregated alarms produced by IT-OCSVM are
significantly decreased compared to the initial ones.
Dataset Initial
alarms
Aggregated
alarms
A 129 16
B 658 21
C 9,273 18
D 203 16
All 10,507 22
Fig. 14 – IT-OCSVM categorizes aggregated alarms. The left diagram shows aggregated alarms created by IT-OCSVM without
the additional medium alarms and the right diagram illustrates all the final alarms created by the IT-OCSVM.
Fig. 15 – Approximate execution time for the entire testing
dataset.
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configuration, performs a classification in a comparable time
to that of a simple OCSVM classifier, and thus, it can be adopted
in soft real-time applications.
We have to mention that the performance evaluation con-
ducted in this subsection does not include the time that each
detection mechanism needs in order to create and dissemi-
nate IDMEF messages or the computational and time costs that
the correlator needs in order to collect and analyze the alarms.
It is evident that the OCSVM classifier, compared to the pro-
posed IT-OCSVM, needs significant additional time in order to
send all the detected alarms. Moreover, the categorization that
is performed by the IT-OCSVM mechanism reduces the com-
putational load of the correlator that collects the alarms from
the distributed detection agents.
5. Conclusion
This article analyzes the IT-OCSVM mechanism and evalu-
ates it against the baseline method for different attack
scenarios. The detection mechanism, which runs in a distrib-
uted way, can be used in large SCADA networks with no
additional modifications. The combination of social network
analysis metrics with machine learning classification tech-
niques enhances the performance of the detection mechanism
and improves accuracy for all the simulation scenarios inves-
tigated. Moreover, the aggregation procedure embedded in the
proposed mechanism decreases the overhead of the IT-
OCSVM and makes it easily incorporable in a soft real time
system.That is, the method produces a small amount of final
alerts and manages to detect all the simulated attacks.
In future work the proposed mechanism will be further en-
hanced in order to decrease false alarms and increase detection
accuracy. It will be tested in a bigger hybrid testbed under dif-
ferent attack scenarios and other behavior patterns will be also
evaluated, e.g. the patterns of interaction among entities,
thereby addingmore sophistication to the detectionmechanism.
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A novel intrusion detection method based on
OCSVM and K-means recursive clusteringH
Leandros A. Maglaras1,∗, Jianmin Jiang1
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Abstract
In this paper we present an intrusion detection module capable of detecting malicious network traffic in a SCADA
(Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) system, based on the combination of One-Class Support Vector
Machine (OCSVM) with RBF kernel and recursive k-means clustering. Important parameters of OCSVM, such
as Gaussian width σ and parameter ν affect the performance of the classifier. Tuning of these parameters is of
great importance in order to avoid false positives and over fitting. The combination of OCSVM with recursive k-
means clustering leads the proposed intrusion detection module to distinguish real alarms from possible attacks
regardless of the values of parameters σ and ν, making it ideal for real-time intrusion detection mechanisms for
SCADA systems. Extensive simulations have been conducted with datasets extracted from small and medium
sized HTB SCADA testbeds, in order to compare the accuracy, false alarm rate and execution time against the
base line OCSVM method.
Keywords: Cyber security, SCADA systems, support vector machine, machine learning
1. Introduction
Several techniques and algorithms have been reported
by researchers for intrusion detection [2, 3]. One big
family of intrusion detection algorithms is rule based
algorithms [4]. In real applications though, during
abnormal situations, the behavior of the system cannot
be predicted and does not follow any known pattern
or rule. This characteristic makes rule based algorithms
incapable of detecting the intrusion.
Generally, anomaly detection can be regarded
as binary classification problem and thus many
classification algorithms which are utilized for detecting
anomalies, such as neural networks, support vector
machines, K-nearest neighbor (KNN) and Hidden
Markov model can be used. However, strictly speaking,
they are not intrusion detection algorithms, as they
require knowing what kind of anomaly is expecting,
which deviates the fundamental object of intrusion
detection. In addition these algorithms may be sensitive
to noise in the training samples.
Segmentation and clustering algorithms [5] seem to be
better choices because they do not need to know the
signatures of the series. The shortages of such algorithms
are that they always need parameters to specify a
proper number of segmentation or clusters and the
detection procedure has to shift from one state to another
HThis is an extended version of the paper [1]
∗Corresponding author. Email: l.maglaras@surrey.ac.uk
state. Negative selection algorithms [6] on the other
hand,are designed for one-class classification; however,
these algorithms can potentially fail with the increasing
diversity of normal set and they are not meant to the
problem with a small number of self-samples, or general
classification problem where probability distribution
plays a crucial role. Furthermore, negative selection only
works for a standard sequence, which is not suitable for
on line detection. Other algorithms, such as time series
analysis are also introduced to anomaly detections, and
again, they may not be suitable for most of the real
application cases.
To minimize the above mention drawbacks an
intelligent approach based on OCSVM [One-Class
Support Vector Machine] principles are proposed for
intrusion detection. OCSVM is a natural extension of
the support vector algorithm to the case of unlabeled
data, especially for detection of outliers. The OCSVM
algorithm maps input data into a high dimensional
feature space (via a kernel) and iteratively finds the
maximal margin hyperplane which best separates the
training data from the origin (Figure 1).
OCSVM principles have shown great potential in the
area of anomaly detection [7–9]. IDS can provide active
detection and automated responses during intrusions
[10]. Commercial IDS products such as NetRanger,
RealSecure, and Omniguard Intruder alert work on
attack signatures. These signatures needed to be updated
by the vendors on a regular basis in order to protect
from new types of attacks. Most of the current intrusion
1
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detection commercial softwares are based on approaches
with statistics embedded feature processing, time series
analysis and pattern recognition techniques. Several
extensions of OCSVM method have been introduced
lately [11, 12].
OCSVM similar to other one-class classifiers e.g.
GDE[13], PGA [14], suffer from false positive and over
fitting situations. Intrusion detection systems (IDS) fail
to deal with all kinds of attacks, while on the other hand,
false alarms that are arisen from high sensitive IDS arise
high economic risks. These situations are described in
subsection 1.1
1.1. motivation
For the OCSVM with an RBF kernel, two parameters σ
and ν need to be carefully selected in order to obtain
the optimal classification result. A common strategy
is to separate the data set into two parts, of which
one is considered unknown. The prediction accuracy
obtained from the unknown set more precisely reflects
the performance on classifying an independent data set.
An improved version of this procedure is known as
cross-validation. Cross-validation is a model validation
technique for assessing how the results of a statistical
analysis will generalize to an independent data set. It is
mainly used in settings where the goal is prediction, and
one wants to estimate how accurately a predictive model
will perform in practice.
In ν-fold cross-validation [15, 16], the training set
is divided into ν subsets of equal size. Sequentially
one subset is tested using the classifier trained on the
remaining ν .. 1 subsets . Thus, each instance of the whole
training set is predicted once so the cross-validation
accuracy is the percentage of data which are correctly
classified. The cross-validation procedure can prevent the
over fitting problem.
Using an ensemble of decision mechanisms with
different parameters, is another method to have an
optimal result. An ensemble of classifiers [17] is a set
of classifiers whose individual decisions are combined
in some way. more trusted final decision. Ensemble
systems of classifiers are widely used for intrusion
detection in networks. Classifier ensemble design aims
to include mutually complementary individual classifiers
which are characterized by high diversity either in terms
of classifier structure [18], internal parameters [19] or
classifier inputs [20].
Unnthorsson et al. [21] proposed another method to
select parameters for the OCSVM. In their method, ν
was first set to a user-specified allowable fraction of
misclassification of the target class (e.g. 1% or 5%), then
the appropriate σ value was selected as the value for
the classification accuracy curve of training samples first
reaches 1− ν. The obtained ν and σ combination can
then be used in the OCSVM classification.
OCSVM similar to other one-class classifiers suffer
from false positive and over fitting. The former is a
situation that occurs when the classifier fires an alarm in
the absence of real anomaly in the system and happens
when parameter σ has too large vale. The latter is the
situation when a model begins to memorize training
data rather than learning to generalize from trend and
it shows up when parameter σ is given relatively small
value [22].
In this article we propose the combination of OCSVM
method with a recursive k-means clustering, separating
the real from false alarms in real time and with no pre-
selection of parameters σ and ν.
1.2. Contributions
The present article develops a intrusion detection
method, namely the K-means OCSVM (K−OCSVM).
Using the well known OCSVM method with default
values for parameters σ and ν we distinguish real
from false alarms with the use of a recursive k-means
clustering method. This is very different from all previous
methods that required pre-selection of parameters with
the use of cross-validation or other methods that
ensemble outcomes of One class classifiers.
The article makes the following contributions:
• A new one class classifier K−OCSVM is proposed.
• The proposed classifier combines a OCSVM with
RBF kernel with a recursive K-means clustering
method.
• K−OCSVM separates in real time false from real
alarms.
• A performance evaluation of the proposed
method against a OCSVM classifier with different
parameters is conducted, which attest the stability
of the new structure.
The rest of this article is organized as follows: Section 2
describes the OCSVM method. In Section 3 the use
of OCSVM in SCADA systems is presented; Section 4
presents the features extracted from the network traces
for the testing and training of the model Section 5
describes the K−OCSVM method; Section 6 presents
the simulation environment and results. In Section 7
discusses possible enhancements of the method. Section 8
concludes the article.
2. OCSVM method
The one-class classification problem is a special case of
the conventional two-class classification problem, where
only data from one specific class are available and
well represented. This class is called the target class.
Another class, which is called the outlier class, can be
sampled very sparsely, or even not at all. This smaller
2
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class contains data that appear when the operation of
the system varies from the normal, due to a possible
attack. In general cases, the outlier class might be very
difficult or expensive to measure. Therefore, in the one
class classifier training process, mainly samples from the
target class are used and there is no information about
its counterpart. The boundary between the two classes
has to be estimated from data in the only available
target class. Thus, the task is to define a boundary
around the target class, such that it encircles as many
target examples as possible and minimizes the chance of
accepting outliers.
Figure 1. OCSVM maps input data into a high dimensional
feature space
Scholkopf et al. [23] developed an OCSVM algorithm
to deal with the one-class classification problem. The
OCSVM may be viewed as a regular two-class SVM,
where all the training data lie in the first class, and the
origin is taken as the only member of the second class.
The OCSVM algorithm first maps input data into a high
dimensional feature space via a kernel function and then
iteratively finds the maximal margin hyperplane, which
best separates the training data from the origin. Thus,
the hyperplane (or linear decision boundary) corresponds
to the classification function
f(x) =< x,w > +b (1)
where w is the normal vector and b is a bias term.
The OCSVM solves an optimization problem to find
the function f with maximal geometric margin. This
classification function can be used to assign a label to
a test example x. If f(x) < 0, then x is labeled as an
anomaly (outlier class), otherwise it is labeled normal
(target class).
Using kernel functions, solving the OCSVM optimiza-
tion problem is equivalent to solving the following dual
quadratic programming problem.
min
1
2
∑
i,j
aiajK(xi, xj) (2)
subject to 0 ≤ ai ≤ 1/νl, and
∑
i ai ≤ 1.
Parameter ai is a Lagrange multiplier, which can be
thought of as a weight for example x, such that vectors
associated with non-zero weights are called support
vectors and solely determine the optimal hyperplane,
ν is parameter that controls the trade-off between
maximizing the number of data points contained by the
hyperplane and the distance of the hyperplane from the
origin, l is the number of points in the training dataset,
and K(xi, xj) is the kernel function.
Using the kernel function to project input vectors
into a feature space, nonlinear decision boundaries are
allowed. Generally, four types of kernel are often used:
linear, polynomial, sigmoid and Gaussian radial basis
function (RBF) kernels. In this paper, we use the RBF
kernel, which has been commonly used for the OCSVM.
K(xi, xj) = exp(−σ||xi − xj ||2), σ > 0 (3)
Although the OCSVM requires samples of the target
class only as training samples, some studies showed that
when negative examples (i.e. samples of outlier classes)
are available, they can be used during the training to
improve the performance of the OCSVM. In this paper
only normal data were used for the training of the
method, though a similar to the one proposed by Tax
[24], which includes a small amount of samples of the
outlier class, will be also applied and evaluated in the
near future.
3. OCSVM for SCADA system
Cyber-attacks against SCADA systems [25] are con-
sidered extremely dangerous for Critical Infrastructure
(CI) operation and must be addressed in a specific way
[26]. Presently one of the most adopted attacks to a
SCADA system is based on fake commands sent from the
SCADA to the RTUs. OCSVM [27, 28] possesses several
advantages for processing SCADA environment data and
automate SCADA performance monitoring, which can be
highlighted as:
• In the case of SCADA performance monitoring,
which patterns in data are normal or abnormal
may not be obvious to operators. Since OCSVM
does not require any signatures of data to build
the detection model it is well suited for intrusion
detection in SCADA environment.
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• Since the detection mechanism does not require
any prior information of the expected attack types,
OCSVM is capable of detection both known and
unknown (novel) attacks.
• In practice training data, taken from SCADA
environment, could include noise samples. Most
of the classification based intrusion detection
methods are very sensitive to noise. However,
OCSVM detection approach is robust to noise
samples in the training process.
• Algorithm configuration can be controlled by the
user to regulate the percentage of anomalies
expected.
• Due to the low computation time, OCSVM
detectors can operate fast enough for online
SCADA performance monitoring.
• Typically monitoring data of SCADA systems
consists of several attributes and OCSVM is
capable of handling multiple attributed data.
4. Attribute extraction
Feature extraction is essential in a classification problem.
In order to train the OCSVM module properly we used
network trace files from a secure wireless network in
University of Surrey. Based on previous analysis of data
[29] we selected some initial features that are used as
attributes for our OCSVM model .
Attributes in the network traces datasets have
all forms: continuous, discrete, and symbolic, with
significantly varying resolution and ranges. Most pattern
classification methods are not able to process data
in such a format. Hence pre-processing was required
before pattern classification models could be built. Pre-
processing consists of two steps: first step involved
mapping symbolic-valued attributes to numeric-valued
attributes and second step implemented scaling The
main advantage of scaling is to avoid attributes in
greater numeric ranges dominating those in smaller
numeric ranges. Another advantage is to avoid numerical
difficulties during the calculation.
Based on the above observations we used the network
trace dataset in order to test our OCSVM module. The
attributes that we used for this initial training / testing
phase, were rate & packet size. The values were scaled
to the range [0,1].
The rate (1st attribute) was calculated using the
equation 4:
Ratescaled =
Time difference
Max time difference
(4)
Time difference is calculated by the difference of time
of current packet and the time of previous packet injected
in the system.
The packet size (2nd attribute) was scaled using the
equation 5:
Packetscaled =
packet size
Max packet size
(5)
5. K−OCSVM
The proposed K−OCSVM combines the well known
OCSVM classifier with the RBF kernel with a recursive
K-means clustering module. Figure 2 illustrates the
procedure of intrusion detection of our proposed
K−OCSVM model.
Kthresh or 
1 cluster 
Extract features 
OCSVM with default parameters 
K- means clustering 
Read 
data – 
Send 
IDMEF 
K-OCSVM 
Figure 2. K−OCSVM module
The OCSVM classifier runs with default parameters
and the outcome consists of all possible outliers. These
outliers are clustered using the k-means clustering
method with 2 clusters, where the initial means of the
clusters are the maximum and the minimum negative
values returned by the OCSVM module. From the two
clusters that are created from the K-means clustering,
the one that is closer to the maximum negative value
(severe alerts) is used as input in the next call of the
K-means clustering. This procedure is repeated until all
outcomes are put in the same cluster or the divided set
is big enough compared to the initial one, according to
the threshold parameter kthres.
K-means clustering method divides the outcomes
according to their values and those outcomes with most
negative values are kept. That way, after the completion
of this recursive procedure only the most severe alerts are
communicated from the K−OCSVM. The division of the
data need no previous knowledge about the values of the
outcomes which may vary from -0.1 to -160 depending of
the assigned values to parameters σ and ν. The method
can find the most important/possible outliers for any
given values to parameters σ and ν.
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One important parameter that affects the performance
of K−OCSVM is the value of threshold kthres. For given
value 2, the final cluster of severe alerts that the method
communicates to other parts of the IDS system is limited
to 2 to 4 alarms. For bigger value (3 or more) the number
of alerts also rises till the method degrades to the initial
OCSVM. The optimal value for the given parameter
kthres is a matter for future investigation.
In order to cooperate with the other modules the
OCSVM module needed to be integrated in the PID
system and communicate with the other modules. Once
an intrusion is detected several actions can be taken
by the IDS (intrusion detection system. These actions
include recording of intrusions in log files, sending of
alert messages, limit the bandwidth of the intruder or
even block all connections from the intruder. In order
to better cooperate with the other components/modules
that are being produced in the CockpitCI project the
OCSVM model sends IDMEF [30] files.
6. Performance evaluation
6.1. Training of OCSVM model
The initial training of both the OCSVM and the
K−OCSVM modules is conducted using several trace
files
• a trace file that is sniffed out of a typical wireless
network (Figure 3) that consists of 10.000 lines
each representing a packet send in the network.
• datasets of a testbed under normal operation
• datasets of a medium sized SCADA system under
normal operation
To train the OCSVM, we adopt the RBF for the
kernel equation. This kernel nonlinearly maps samples
into a higher dimensional space so it can handle the case
when the relation between class labels and attributes is
nonlinear.
Figure 3. Format of the transformed Network trace file
The training model that is extracted after the training
of the OCSVM is used for on line detection of malicious
data. Since the model is based on features that are
related to network traffic, and since the traffic of the
system varies from area to area and from time period to
time period, possible generation of multiple models could
improve the performance of the module.
The network traffic in electric grids varies according
to the activity which is not constant during the day.
Also in some areas the activity follows different patterns
according to the local demand. These characteristics
maybe be critical for the proper training of the module
and the accurate detection of intruders.
6.2. Testing of OCSVM model
We evaluate the performance of the method using data
from the wireless network of the University campus,
from a testbed that mimics a small-scale SCADA system
and from a Hybrid testbed of a medium sized SCADA
system. The parameters used for the evaluation of the
performance of K−OCSVM are listed in Table 1.
Parameter Range of Values Default value
σ 0.1 - 0.0001 0.007
ν 0.002 - 0.05 0.01
kthresh 2 - 3 2
Table 1. Evaluation Parameters
Wireless network. In order to test our model we
use another network trace file sniffed from the wireless
network. The testing trace file consists of it 30.000 lines.
We compare the performance of our proposed model
against OCSVM classifiers having the same values for
parameters σ and ν. We name each OCSVM classifier
according to the parameters σ and ν : OCSVM0.07,0.01
stands for OCSVM classifier with parameters σ = 0.07
and ν = 0.01.
In Table 2 we show the number of observed anomalies
detected from OCSVM and K−OCSVM respectively.
From this table it is shown how parameters σ, ν affect
the performance of OCSVM. Even for a value of ν equal
to 0.005, OCSVM produces over 400 possible attacks,
making the method inappropriate for a SCADA system
where each false alarm is costly.
Parameter σ Parameter ν K−OCSVM ocsvm
0.007 0.002 3 408
0.007 0.01 3 299
0.007 0.005 2 408
0.0001 0.01 3 274
0.1 0.01 2 295
Table 2. Performance evaluation of K−OCSVM and
OCSVM for Kthers = 2.
In figure 4 we present the outcome that OCSVM
produces for the training network trace under different
values of parameters σ and ν. From this figure it
is obvious that the outcome is strongly affected by
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the values of these parameters, making K−OCSVM
necessary tool for proper intrusion detection.
Figure 4. OCSVM classification outcome for different val-
ues of parameters σ, ν Upper diagram : OCSVM0.007,0.001,
Lower diagram : OCSVM0.01,0.05
Testbed scenario. The second trial is conducted off
line with the use of two datasets extracted from the
testbed (Figure 5). The testbed architecture mimics a
small-scale SCADA system, comprising the operations
and field networks and including a Human-Machine
Interface Station (for process monitoring), a managed
switch (with port monitoring capabilities, for network
traffic capture), and two Programmable Logic Controller
Units, for process control. The NIDS and OCSVM
modules are co-located on the same host, being able to
intercept all the traffic flowing on the network scopes.
During the testing period several attack scenarios
are simulated in the testbed. These scenarios include
network scan, network flood and MITM attack.
Three kinds of attacks are being evaluated:
• Network scan attack In typical network scan
attack, the attacker uses TCP/FIN scan to
determine if ports are closed to the target machine.
Figure 5. Architecture of the testbed
Closed ports answer with RST packets while open
ports discard the FIN message. FIN packets blend
with background noise on a link and are hard to
be detected.
• ARP cache spoofing - MITM attack ARP
cache spoofing is a technique where an attacker
sends fake ARP messages. The aim is to associate
the attacker’s MAC address with the IP address of
another host, causing any traffic meant for that
IP to be sent to attacker instead. The attacker
could choose to inspect the packets, modify data
before forwarding (man-in-the-middle attack)
or launch a denial of service attack by causing some
of the packets to be dropped.
• DoS attack Network flood is the instance where
the attacker floods the connection with the PLC
by sending SYN packets. In a TCP SYN flooding
attack, an attacker sends many SYN messages,
with fictitious (spoofed) IP addresses, to a single
node (victim). Although the node replies with
SYN/ACK messages, these messages are never
acknowledged by the client. As a result, many half
open connections exist on the victim, consuming
its resources. This continues until the victim has
consumed all its resources, hence can no longer
accept new TCP connection requests.
In Table 3 we show the number of alert messages
(IDMEF) sent from OCSVM and K−OCSVM respec-
tively. From this table it is shown how parameters
σ, ν affect the performance of OCSVM for the testbed
scenario. While for the same network trace file OCSVM
produces from 10529 to 10704 alert messages according
to the values of the parameters, K−OCSVM produces
the same 120 alert messages. All the reported attacks
are concerning the DoS attack that creates the biggest
fluctuation in the network traffic.
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Parameter σ Parameter ν K−OCSVM ocsvm
0.007 0.002 120 10529
0.007 0.01 120 10703
0.007 0.005 120 10584
0.0001 0.01 120 10602
0.1 0.01 120 10704
Table 3. Performance evaluation of K−OCSVM and
OCSVM for Kthers = 2.
Testbed scenario with split testing periods. Since
the attacks are performed during different time periods
we divide the testing dataset in several smaller ones, each
containing a different attack. Testing data consists of
normal data and attack data and the composition of the
data sets are as follows:
• Testing set-A’ : 1 - 5000: Normal data
• Testing set-B’ : 5000 - 10000: Normal data + Arp
spoofing attack + Network scan
• Testing set-C’ : 10000 - 25000: Normal data +
Flooding Dos attack + Network scan
• Testing set-D’ : 25000 - 41000: Normal data +
MITM attack
Dataset Initial alarms Aggregated alarms
A 129 2
B 658 3
C 9273 120
D 203 3
All 10507 120
Table 4. Aggregated alarms produced by K−OCSVM are
significantly decreased compared to the initial alarms
From table 4 we observe that not only the most
important intrusions are detected and reported but also
the total overhead on the system is limited. For all
time periods the messages communicated reflect actual
attacks in the network, except from the testing set-A’. In
this time period HMI station demonstrated a significant
variation in the rate that it injected packets in the system
between testing and training of the module. This is due
to the limited training of the OCSVM and can be avoided
if training dataset consists of data that represent the
traffic in the network during under work loads. The
increased number of alarms created from K−OCSVM
for the dataset B’ is due to the fact in this time period
the attacker uses an excessive number of SYN packets in
order to flood the communication channel.
Hybrid Testbed scenario. The third trial is
conducted off line with the use of large datasets extracted
from a Hybrid Testbed (HTB) scenario. The Hybrid
testbed architecture mimics a medium-scale SCADA
system, comprising the operations and field networks
and including Human-Machine Interface Stations (for
process monitoring), six managed switches (with port
monitoring capabilities, for network traffic capture), and
several Programmable Logic Controller Units, for process
control. The initial dataset consists of over 3 million
rows, each representing a packet sent in the system,
capturing network of several days. The dataset is split
in 65 smaller ones of 50.000 rows. The datasets contain
only data from a normal operation of the HTB.
Both OCSVM and K−OCSVM are trained and tested
with these datasets, using cross validation. The mean
number of alert messages sent by the two modules is
shown in Table 5.
Parameter σ Parameter ν K−OCSVM ocsvm
0.007 0.002 1 - 2 40
0.007 0.01 1 - 2 207
0.007 0.005 1 - 2 105
0.0001 0.01 1 - 2 85
0.1 0.01 1 - 2 271
Table 5. Performance evaluation of K−OCSVM and
OCSVM for Kthers = 2
Using real datasets of a medium sized HTB SCADA
system the performance of the proposed K−OCSVM
method is very stable compared to a simple OCSVM
under the same configuration. This behavior is very
promising since K−OCSVM method has a very low false
alarm rate (lower than 0.02 %) while on the same time
the overhead induced by the method is negligible (C.F.
Subsection 6.3. We must state here that for the HTB
we had available only non malicious datasets for the
evaluatioin of the proposed method. In the future when
datasets containing malicious attacks are available an
extensive evaluation of the K−OCSVM method is going
to be conducted in terms of accuracy and false alarm
rate.
6.3. Computational cost and time
overhead
Complexity of an intrusion detection system can be
attributed to hardware, software and operation factors.
For simplicity, it is usually estimated as the computing
time required to perform classification of the dataset
and output the final alarms. In order to evaluate the
complexity of the proposed method we calculate the
execution time and compare it to a simple OCSVM
module. The evaluation is conducted on a PC with Intel
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core 2 duo 1.7 Mhz CPU, 2GB main memory, 80GB hard
disk 7200 rpm hard disk and Microsoft windows 7 64bit.
In Figure 6 we represent the time performance of the
method compared to a simple OCSVM module for the
testbed scenario.
Figure 6. Computational cost for the testbed scenario
According to Figure 6 execution time of the proposed
K−OCSVM is slightly bigger compared to a simple
OCSVM method. The performance gap is around 5%
to 10% for all the datasets used in the simulation.
Based on these observations we conclude that the
system, performs a classiffication in a comparable time
to that of a simple OCSVM classifier, and it thus
can be adopted in soft real-time applications. We have
to mention that the performance evaluation which is
conducted in this subsection, does not include the
time that each detection mechanism needs in order to
create and disseminate IDMEF messages. It is evident
that the OCSVM classifer, compared to the proposed
K−OCSVM, needs significant additional time in order
to send all the detected alarms.
7. Discussion
The proposed K−OCSVM can significantly reduce the
produced alarms from the OCSVM module that is
the heart of the detection mechanism. The profound
advantages of low overhead and low false alarm rate
come with the cost of lower accuracy and higher
computational overhead. In this section we discuss some
enhancements of the proposed method that can improve
its performance.
7.1. Parameter kthres
As stated is Section 5 K−OCSVM method is a
recursive clustering of the alarms produced by the
OCSVM module. This recursive procedure is used in
order to distinguish severe from possible alarms and
finally disseminate only those that represent an actual
misbehavior of the system. This way the OCSVM module
is enhanced in both the decreased overhead that induces
to the system from the disseminated alarm files and in
the decreased false alarm rate that it has. The recursive
method stops when either all initial alarms are put in
the same cluster or when the divided set is big enough
compared to the initial one, according to the threshold
parameter kthres.
In the simulations presented in Subsection 6 the
parameter is set to 2. When raising the value of this
parameter the produced final alarms of the proposed
K−OCSVM method raises. This raise also leads to a
raise in the false alarm rate. On the other hand the
accuracy of the method raises since less profound attacks
are detected. By raising the value of the parameter above
one limit the method degrades to the initial OCSVM.
The optimum value for parameter K−OCSVM varies
according to the architecture of the network. For big
disperse networks large value of the parameter would
lead to the creation of too many alarms from the module,
while on the same time in a medium sized network very
small value of the parameter would lead to a dangerous
decrease of the detection capabilities of the module.
Except from the static configuration of the network,
traffic conditions can also affect the performance of
the method. In real SCADA systems the network
traffic varies between daytime and night, weekdays and
weekends. In order to cope with both static and dynamic
features of the network an enhanced K−OCSVM
method that dynamically adapts the parameter kthres,
similar to [31, 32] could be effective.
7.2. Multi stage K−OCSVM
The proposed method uses only the values of the
initial alarms in order to filter out those that don’t
represent an actual attack. That way attacks that cause
significant variation in certain features of the OCSVM
module are detected, while on the same time other more
insidious attacks are passing undetected. A multi stage
K−OCSVM where both the number of attacks that
share common characteristics, like origin, destination,
port number e.t.c., and the actual values of the attacks
can be developed in order to better detect different kinds
of attacks.
Figure 7 represents a possible architecture of a two
stage K−OCSVM module. The number of the stages
can be increased and the alarms produced by each stage
can be further aggregated. The fusion of the outputs of
the different stages can be done using any of the existing
ensemble methods .i.e. majority voting, performance
weighting, distribution summation, order statistics e.t.c.
8. Conclusions
We have presents an intrusion detection module for
SCADA systems that is based in OCSVM classifier and
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Figure 7. Architecture of a Multi stage K−OCSVM
a recursive k-means clustering method. The module is
trained off-line by network traces, after the attributes
are extracted from the network dataset. The intrusion
detection module is part of an distributed IDS system.
The method is tested on three different datasets. For
the first testing scenario, traces of a wireless network
are used. This test shows that the method is stable
and its performance is not influenced by the selection
of parameters ν and σ. For the second scenario, testing
of the proposed module is conducted with datasets
that are sniffed of a testbed that mimics a small-scale
SCADA system under different attack scenarios. After
the completion of the test, not only the most important
intrusions are detected and reported by K−OCSVM but
also the total overhead on the system is limited. Finally
extensive testing of the K−OCSVM module with real
datasets extracted from a medium sized HTB SCADA
system shows that the performance of the proposed
K−OCSVM method remains very stable under different
configurations. After the execution of the K−OCSVM
method, for all the simulated scenarios, only severe
alerts are communicated to the system by IDMEF files
that contain information about the source, destination,
protocol and time of the intrusion.
The main feature of K−OCSVM module is that it
can perform anomaly detection in a time-efficient way,
with good accuracy and low overhead. Low overhead
is an important evaluation metric of a distributed
detection module that is scattered in a real-time system,
since frequent communication of IDMEF files from
detection agents degrade the performance of the SCADA
network. Recursive k-means clustering, reassures that
small fluctuations on network traffic, which most of
the times cause OCSVM to trigger false alarms, are
ignored by the proposed detection module. The added
computational time of the method compared to a simple
OCSVM varies between 5% and 10% which results in
a neglective time overhead. This overhead does not
include the time that each detection mechanism needs
in order to create and disseminate IDMEF messages. By
adding the time needed in order to create and send each
IDMEF file to the IDS management system the proposed
K−OCSVM method prevails on the overall performance
in terms of time efficiency.
Finally we investigate how parameter kthres affects the
performance of the method and proposed a multi-stage
K−OCSVM method for better accuracy. As future work
we will conduct an in depth performance evaluation of
the proposed mechanism. Using malicious and attack-
free datasets of the HTB SCADA testbed, we are
going to evaluate K−OCSVM’s performance in terms
of false positive rate and accuracy. Using the evaluation
outcomes we are planning to modify the proposed
K−OCSVM in order to further decrease false alarms
and improve overall performance.
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Integrated OCSVM mechanism for intrusion
detection in SCADA systems
Leandros A. Maglaras, Jianmin Jiang and Tiago Cruz
Intrusion detection in real-time systems is a problem without a pro-
found solution. In supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)
systems the absence of a defence mechanism that can cope with differ-
ent types of intrusions is of great importance. False positive alarms or
mistakes regarding the origin of the intrusion mean severe costs for the
system. An integrated one-class support vector machine (OCSVM)
mechanism that is distributed in a SCADA network is presented, as
a part of an intrusion detection system, providing accurate information
about the origin and the time of an intrusion. The module reads the
network trafﬁc, splits trafﬁc according to the source of the packets
and creates a cluster of OCSVM models. These trained models run in
parallel and can accurately and fast recognise different types of attacks.
Introduction: Cyber-physical systems are becoming vital to modernising
the national critical infrastructure (CI) systems. Owing to the rapid
increase of sophisticated cyber threats with exponentially destructive
effects, intrusion detection systems (IDSs) must systematically evolve
[1]. Most weaknesses of CIs arise from the fact that most of them are
adopting on off-the-shelf technologies from the IT world, without a
signiﬁcant change in terms of the operator mindset, and still based on
the ‘airgap’ security principle that suggests that an apparently isolated
and obscure system is implicitly secure. Once one opens the system to
off-the-shelf solutions, you also increase its exposure to cyber-attacks [2].
The design of supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)
systems is different from conventional IT networks, even if based on
the same physical technology, such as Ethernet networks. Industrial
control-speciﬁc protocols are used in SCADA systems, where a
limited number of packet types is exchanged between entities of the
network. Moreover, the effect of some widely known attacks might
have devastating consequences on SCADA systems. This situation
requires the development of IDSs speciﬁcally designed for SCADA
systems, and being able to ensure an adequate balance between high
accuracy, low false alarm rate (FAR) and reduced network trafﬁc over-
head. Among other approaches, neural networks, support vector
machines, K-nearest neighbour and hidden Markov model can be
used for intrusion detection. One-class support vector machine
(OCSVM) principles have shown great potential in the area of
anomaly detection [3, 4].
We propose a novel mechanism, in the form of an intelligent approach
based on OCSVM principles. The proposed mechanism uses a central
OCSVM and a cluster of automatically produced OCSVMs, one for
each source that induces signiﬁcant trafﬁc in the system, along with
social metric analysis, an aggregation technique, a voting mechanism
and a K-means clustering method that categorise ﬁnal aggregated
alerts. The mechanism is incorporated in a distributed IDS communicat-
ing with other detection and management components by producing
dedicated intrusion detection message exchange format (IDMEF) mess-
ages that report the severity of the attack detected.
Proposed detection module: The main purpose of the integrated detec-
tion module is to perform anomaly detection in a time-efﬁcient way,
with good accuracy and low overhead, within a temporal window ade-
quate for the nature of SCADA systems. To achieve the aforementioned
goals, several operation stages need to be carried out:
† Selection of the most appropriate features for the training of the
OCSVM models and pre-processing of raw input data.
† Creation of cluster of split OCSVM models that are trained on dis-
crete sources. It is important to mention that we do not create a split
OCSVM for each source but only for those sources that produce high
trafﬁc in the network during the training period.
† Fusion of the information gathered by the cluster of split OCSVMs
and the central OCSVM in order to ﬁre initial alarms.
† Creation of IDMEF ﬁles. The created ﬁles describe the nature of the
alert, in terms of importance, the location in the system, time etc.
Features of central OCSVM: The features and their corresponding
network data features are shown in Tables 1 and 2. Feature 3 examines
only the packets in the last 10 packets that have the same destination host
as the current packet (same host feature). Feature 4 examines only the
packets in the past 10 packets that have both the same source and the
destination as the current packet. For producing feature 5, each row of
the dataset is assigned a value indicating the number of ARP packets
in the last 10 packets.
Table 1: Features of central OCSVM model
A/A Network date feature Type of feature
1 Packet size Content based
2 Rate Time based
3 Nopackets–dst Time based
4 Nopackets–src–dst Time based
5 NoARP–packets Time based
Table 2: Performance evaluation of OCSVM module
Dataset DA (%) FAR (%)
A 98.81 1.18
B 94.6 3.25
C 95.2 1.51
D 96.37 2.3
All 96.3 2.5
Features of cluster of split OCSVMs: There are many slow probing
attacks that scan the hosts using a much larger interval and merge in
the overall trafﬁc in the network. As a consequence, these attacks
cannot be detected using derived time-based features. To capture these
types of attacks, we modiﬁed the OCSVM module to automatically
create a cluster of split OCSVMs. The features of the split OCSVM
modules are a subset of the central OCSVM and include features 1, 2
and 5. Moreover, the split datasets, each consisting of the packets sent
only by an individual source, adds to the detection mechanism the
diversity that is crucial in order to improve the overall efﬁciency
(dataset splitting [5]).
Social analysis: To enhance the performance of the OCSVM module, a
statistical algorithm is used. For each signiﬁcant source that is detected
during training, a list of the protocols used is created. These protocols
are ranked and stored along with the IP/MAC address of each source.
During the phase testing the same procedure is executed, producing a
list of the protocols used for each signiﬁcant source. These lists are com-
pared using Spearman’s correlation coefﬁcient [6]. The output of the
method is a numeric value between 1 and 0, with a number closest to
1 indicating similar behaviour of the source both in training and in
testing sessions. This value is used in order to give additional signiﬁ-
cance/weight to alerts produced by the corresponding source
p = 1− 6
∑
d2i
n(n2 − 1) (1)
Fusion of alarms – ﬁnal outputs: Each OCSVM module produces one
initial alarm for any deviation in network trafﬁc from the normal, based
on its model. In real-time systems except from fast response and
accuracy a limited communication between detection modules is also
desirable. For this reason, outcomes of both the central OCSVM and
the split OCSVMs are combined by using a simple mean value
method. The values that are produced from this stage are weighted by
using the social analysis algorithm. The new outcomes are then fed to
the aggregation module that groups alerts per source and gives ﬁnal
scores to aggregated alerts by summing up values of these individual
alerts. The system ﬁnally uses a K-means clustering algorithm in
order to divide the alarms in three categories: possible, medium and
severe. This way, the number of ﬁnal alarms produced by the proposed
mechanism is signiﬁcantly reduced, while at the same time all sources
having suspicious behaviour are reported. The proposed mechanism is
represented in Fig. 1.
Nature of the trial: The trial was conducted off-line with the use of two
datasets extracted from our testbed (Fig. 2). The testbed architecture
mimics a small-scale SCADA system, comprising the operations and
ﬁeld networks and including a Human–Machine Interface Station (for
process monitoring), a managed switch (with port monitoring capabili-
ties, for network trafﬁc capture) and two Programmable Logic
Techset CompositionLtd, Salisbury Doc: {EL}ISSUE/50 -25/Pagination/EL20142897.3d
Information and communications
Controller Units, for process control. The NIDS and OCSVM modules
are co-located on the same host, being able to intercept all the trafﬁc
ﬂowing on the network scopes. Three kinds of attacks are evaluated:
† Network scan attack: In a typical network scan attack, the attacker
uses TCP/FIN scan to determine if ports are closed to the target
machine.
† ARP spooﬁng is a technique where an attacker sends fake ARP mess-
ages aiming to associate the attacker’s MAC address with the IP address
of another host. The attacker could choose to inspect the packets, modify
data before forwarding (‘man-in-the-middle attack (MITM)’) or launch
a denial of service attack by causing some of the packets to be dropped.
† DoS ﬂooding attack: Network ﬂood is the instance where the attacker
ﬂoods the connection with the PLC by sending SYN packets.
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Results and analysis: Each OCSVM that is trained produces a separate
model ﬁle which is used in order to classify new data as normal or
malicious. All OCSVMs use Gaussian RBF kernel functions with
parameters σ = 0.01 and v = 0.001. This Section describes the perform-
ance of the proposed OCSVM-based intrusion detection mechanism
for the simulated data. The detection accuracy (DA) and FAR metrics are
used as indicators to quantify the performance of the detection mechanism
DA = True positives+ True negatives
sample size
× 100% (2)
FAR = False positives
False positives+ True negatives× 100% (3)
Since the attacks are performed during different time periods, we divide the
testing dataset in several smaller ones, each containing one or at most two
different attacks as follows:
Testing set-A’: 1–5000: normal data: In the ﬁrst dataset, there is no
attack in the system and the model produces 60 alarms and 16 aggre-
gated ﬁnal alarms (IDMEF ﬁles). These alarms are categorised as
severe (6) alarm and possible (10).
Testing set-B’: 5000–10 000: normal data + ARP spooﬁng attack +
network scan: In the second dataset, the system ﬁres 658 initial
alarms and 21 aggregated IDMEF ﬁles. The majority of the alerts are
concerning two sources. The ﬁrst is 127.27.1.99 which is used in
order to capture the trafﬁc and produce the network trace. This capturing
of the network trafﬁc is translated from our module as an attack and an
alarm is ﬁred. The second is 00:0C:29:9a:5f:7a which is the MAC
address of the intruder. The ﬁnal aggregated output of the OCSVM
module is two severe alarms (for the actual attackers) and 19 possible
attacks for packets that are classiﬁed as abnormal but with low risk.
Testing set-C’: 10 000–25 000: normal data + DoS ﬂooding attack +
network scan: In the third dataset, the system ﬁres 9273 initial alarms
and 18 ﬁnal aggregated IDMEF ﬁles. One severe alarm is ﬁred for
source 172.27.224.33 which is the IP address of the intruder. This
alarm is classiﬁed as severe.
Testing set-D’: 25 000–41 000: normal data +MITM attack: In the
fourth dataset, the system triggers 203 initial and 16 ﬁnal alarms from
the classiﬁcation algorithm (2 severe and 14 possible alarms). The
MITM attack that is conducted by source 00:0C:29:9a:5f:7a is not
classiﬁed as an attack due to low activity in this time period but the intru-
der was identiﬁed earlier when it was conducting an ARP spooﬁng
attack, which is the preliminary step before the MITM attack.
Full testing dataset – combined attacks: When testing the OCSVM
module with the full dataset which contains all the attacks, the system
produces 10 507 initial alarms and 22 ﬁnal aggregated alarms. The
ﬁnal alarms contain three severe alarms for the sources 127.27.1.99
(trafﬁc capture machine), 00:0C:29:9a:5f:7a (MAC address of the intru-
der) and 172.27.224.33 (IP address of the intruder) and 19 possible
attacks. The overall performance of the system is good and all the real
attacks are classiﬁed as severe alerts.
Conclusion: This Letter proposes a new integrated mechanism for intru-
sion detection in SCADA systems. The mechanism uses network traces
in order to automatically create a cluster of split OCSVMs. Outcomes of
split OCSVMs are combined with those of the central OCSVM, are
weighted using social metrics, aggregated and ﬁnally classiﬁed using
K-means clustering. Final outputs of the mechanism are communicated
with the use of IDMEF messages each one reporting the severity of
the detected attack. The proposed mechanism produces a small amount
of ﬁnal alerts and manages to detect all the attacks efﬁciently. As
future work, the proposed mechanism will be evaluated against other
attack scenarios and will be enhanced in order to improve FAR.
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Abstract—Intrusion detection in Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA) systems is of major importance nowadays.
Most of the systems are designed without cyber security in mind,
since interconnection with other systems through unsafe channels,
is becoming the rule during last years. The de-isolation of SCADA
systems make them vulnerable to attacks, disrupting its correct
functioning and tampering with its normal operation.
In this paper we present a intrusion detection module capable
of detecting malicious network traffic in a SCADA (Supervisory
Control and Data Acquisition) system, based on the combination
of One-Class Support Vector Machine (OCSVM) with RBF
kernel and recursive k-means clustering. The combination of
OCSVM with recursive k-means clustering leads the proposed
intrusion detection module to distinguish real alarms from
possible attacks regardless of the values of parameters σ and
ν, making it ideal for real-time intrusion detection mechanisms
for SCADA systems. The OCSVM module developed is trained
by network traces off line and detect anomalies in the system
real time. The module is part of an IDS (Intrusion Detection
System) system developed under CockpitCI project.
I. INTRODUCTION- MOTIVATION
Several techniques and algorithms have been reported by
researchers for intrusion detection. One big family of intrusion
detection algorithms is rule based algorithms. In real applica-
tions though, during abnormal situations, the behavior of the
system cannot be predicted and does not follow any known
pattern or rule. This characteristic makes rule based algorithms
incapable of detecting the intrusion.
An intelligent approach based on OCSVM [One-Class Sup-
port Vector Machine] principles are proposed for intrusion
detection. OCSVM is a natural extension of the support vector
algorithm to the case of unlabeled data, especially for detection
of outliers. The OCSVM algorithm maps input data into a
high dimensional feature space (via a kernel) and iteratively
finds the maximal margin hyperplane which best separates the
training data from the origin. OCSVM principles have shown
great potential in the area of anomaly detection [1], [2]. Several
extensions of OCSVM method have been introduced lately [3],
[4].
For the OCSVM with an RBF kernel, two parameters σ and
ν need to be carefully selected in order to obtain the optimal
classification result. A common strategy is to separate the data
set into two parts, of which one is considered unknown. The
prediction accuracy obtained from the unknown set more pre-
cisely reflects the performance on classifying an independent
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data set. An improved version of this procedure is known
as cross-validation. Cross-validation is a model validation
technique for assessing how the results of a statistical analysis
will generalize to an independent data set. It is mainly used in
settings where the goal is prediction, and one wants to estimate
how accurately a predictive model will perform in practice.
Unnthorsson et al. [5] proposed a method to select param-
eters for the OCSVM. In their method, ν was first set to a
user-specified allowable fraction of misclassification of the
target class (e.g. 1% or 5%), then the appropriate σ value
was selected as the value for the classification accuracy curve
of training samples first reaches 1− ν. The obtained ν and σ
combination can then be used in the OCSVM classification.
OCSVM similar to other one-class classifiers suffer from
false positive and over fitting. The former is a situation that
occurs when the classifier fires an alarm in the absence of
real anomaly in the system and happens when parameter
σ has too large vale. The latter is the situation when a
model begins to memorize training data rather than learning
to generalize from trend and it shows up when parameter σ
is given relatively small value [6]. In this article we propose
the combination of OCSVM method with a recursive k-means
clustering, separating the real from false alarms in real time
and with no pre-selection of parameters σ and ν.
II. K−OCSVM
The proposed K−OCSVM combines the well known
OCSVM classifier with the RBF kernel with a recursive K-
means clustering module. Figure 1 illustrates the procedure of
intrusion detection of our proposed K−OCSVM model.
The OCSVM classifier runs with default parameters and
the outcome consists of all possible outliers. These outliers are
clustered using the k-means clustering method with 2 clusters,
where the initial means of the clusters are the maximum and
the minimum negative values returned by the OCSVM module.
From the two clusters that are created from the K-means
clustering, the one that is closer to the maximum negative
value (severe alerts) is used as input in the next call of
the K-means clustering. This procedure is repeated until all
outcomes are put in the same cluster or the divided set is big
enough compared to the initial one, according to the threshold
parameter kthres.
K-means clustering method divides the outcomes according
to their values and those outcomes with most negative values
are kept. That way, after the completion of this recursive
procedure only the most severe alerts are communicated from
 Kthresh or 
1 cluster 
Extract features 
OCSVM with default parameters 
K- means clustering 
Read 
data – 
Send 
IDMEF 
K-OCSVM 
Fig. 1: K−OCSVM module
the K−OCSVM. The division of the data need no previous
knowledge about the values of the outcomes which may vary
from -0.1 to -160 depending of the assigned values to parame-
ters σ and ν. The method can find the most important/possible
outliers for any given values to parameters σ and ν.
One important parameter that affects the performance of
K−OCSVM is the value of threshold kthres. For given
value 2, the final cluster of severe alerts that the method
communicates to other parts of the IDS system is limited to 2
to 4 alarms. For bigger value (3 or more) the number of alerts
also rises till the method degrades to the initial OCSVM. The
optimal value for the given parameter kthres is a matter for
future investigation.
III. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Training of OCSVM model
Training of OCSVM module was conducted using a trace
file that is sniffed out of a typical wireless network that
consists of 10.000 lines each representing a packet send in
the network. To train the OCSVM, we adopt the RBF for the
kernel equation. This kernel nonlinearly maps samples into a
higher dimensional space so it can handle the case when the
relation between class labels and attributes is nonlinear.
The training model that is extracted after the training of the
OCSVM is used for on line detection of malicious data. Since
the model is based on features that are related to network
traffic, and since the traffic of the system varies from area to
area and from time period to time period, possible generation
of multiple models could improve the performance of the
module.
B. Testing of OCSVM model
In order to test our model we use another network trace
files sniffed from the wireless network. The testing trace file
consists of 30.000 lines. We compare the performance of our
proposed model against OCSVM classifiers having the same
values for parameters σ and ν.
The parameters used for the evaluation of the performance
of K−OCSVM are listed in Table I.
Parameter Range of Values Default value
σ 0.1 - 0.0001 0.007
ν 0.002 - 0.05 0.01
Threshold 2-3 2
TABLE I: Evaluation Parameters
In Table II we show the number of observed anomalies
detected from OCSVM and K−OCSVM respectively. From
this table it is shown how parameters σ, ν affect the perfor-
mance of OCSVM. Even for a value of ν equal to 0.005,
OCSVM produces almost 500 possible attacks, making the
method inappropriate for a SCADA system where each false
alarm is costly.
Parameter σ Parameter ν K−OCSVM ocsvm
0.007 0.002 3 408
0.007 0.01 3 299
0.007 0.005 2 408
0.0001 0.01 3 274
0.1 0.01 2 295
TABLE II: Performance evaluation of K−OCSVM and
OCSVM for Kthers = 2.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a intrusion detection module for SCADA
systems that is based in OCSVM classifier and a recursive
k-means clustering method. The module is trained off-line
by network traces, after the attributes are extracted from the
network dataset. The intrusion detection module is part of an
IDS system developed under CoCkpitCI.
After the completion of the K−OCSVM method only
severe alerts are communicated to the system by IDMEF
files that contain information about the source, destination,
protocol and time of the intrusion. The method is stable and
its performance is not influenced by the selection of parameters
ν and σ. Further analysis is needed in order to evaluate the
performance of the method under different attack scenarios.
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